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PHEPAGi^ 
This paper is intended to describe and analyze the 
methods, rationale and influence of the Palestinian Arab 
refugees in their attempts to prevent an Arab-Israeli set— 
tlamant of the Middle dast conflict* Palestinian tactics 
have been both direct and indirect. ;3inc@ 1947» the Pales-
/ 
tinians have had an effect on the policies and actions of the 
United Nations and the five Middle iiiastem governments most 
directly involved. The Palestinians* power and influence 
have grown considerably during the 1960*8 and show little 
prospect of waning. 
The Palestinian conflict, originally oonflaed to diplomatic 
maneuvering betwewi representatives of the Arab states and 
Israel in the United Nations, has gradually broadened to inp> 
elude the Palestinians as an important third elm^nt. Mich of 
the Palestinians* present role in the Middle Eastern wnflict, as 
will be shown, can be directly attributed to actions, or inaction, 
on the part of the regional governments, both in their treat­
ment of the refuses and in their failure to reach a settlement. 
Thou^ the Palestinians are Arabs, their methods and goals differ 
f±om those of the Arab Govemn^nts. Bven with the status being 
accorded them today, the Palestinians sema to be only compli­
cating and prolonging an already complex problem. 
In att^pting to desoriba how the Paleatlaiaas have had 
a negative izifluenoe in reaching a solution of the Middle aaste^i 
oonfliot, it has been necessary to rely, perhapa a little too 
heavily, on «mrrent newspaper and news magazine artioles. /here 
possible. United Nations documents have been used. Hovvever, 
much of the material dealing with current events and refugee 
organization is not available tvom U* H* sources* For, unless 
the military confrontations or governmmital crises directly 
affect U. B. operations in the area, these occurrences are not 
reported in official U* B. documents. Hor has the United Bâtions 
had reason to be concerned with the Palestinians* effects on 
either internal or regional politics of the States involved 
unless these politics have led to a major military clash such 
as in 1967. 
There has also been a dwrth of scholarly articles cxa the 
refugees. Sevwal reasons can be given for this, :'irst, the 
ref\igees tend to be quite secretive about their organizations and 
operations. The refugee population has also been quite mobile and, 
until recently, rather inarticulate. It has been necessary to 
rely on observations by United Nations personnel and journalists 
who have visited the area, and on statements of the refugee 
leaders as they are published in the news s^ia^ in an attempt 
to determine refugee attitudes and objectives. However, a 
variety of sources have been studied and, in general, accounts 
of particular events or of the refugees* feelings and goals do 
not differ signifioantly. 
This paper is not intended to speculate on a solution to 
iii 
the oonfllot. Rather it is designed to show the oomplexities 
of the pr^&nt situation and the present influence of the 
Palestinians, This influence is felt in the refugees' rela­
tionships with Israel and witii the Arabs, both domestioally 
and regionally, and has been pronounced enough to deter these 
govwmmants frcm achieving a solution* Only cursory mmititm is 
made of Arab and Israeli govermwatal positions relative to 
a solution, althou^ their attitude toward liie reAigees is 
explained, fio mention is mide of outside governmental stands, 
and particularly those of the Soviet Unicm and the United States. 
Therefore, the scope of the paper is not such as to allow for 
cmtlining a final or complete solution. 
iv 
OBAPTÏÏR I 
IHTHODUCTIOH 
The Palestine problmn, around today's Mddle Zast 
oonn.iot is oentered, has roots far older than the United 
J^ations interventimi in 1947* Religious oonfllot, one faoet 
of the present problmi, oan be traced badk to Biblical times 
and the o<mfliots betweœn the Moslems and the Jews, However, 
despite religious differences, the present problem oan largely 
be attributed to various polioies of ths British Ckxvemment 
during tbe early Twentieth Ceniairy, and to the United Hâtions 
partitioning of Palestine in 1947# 
Prior to Israel's beocHsing a sovereign state in 1948# the 
territory of Palestine^ had bemi undw British rule. In 1917» 
Lord Balfour of the British Govammmit issued a statement 
granting the Jem the right to a Jewish National Home in 
Palestine. The Jewish population interpreted this statanent, 
known as the Balfour Deolarati<m, to mean that Great Britain 
acknowledged the Jews* right to a separate state. The Arab 
population felt #e Declaration granted the Jews a ri^t to 
%ee maps. Appendices A, B, and C. Before 1923, Palestine 
was the geographical area which is now the states of Jordan and 
Israel^ includiz^ all of the areas now occupied by Israel except 
for the Sinai Peninsula. In 1946, Jordan, or Transjoardan, was 
granted full sovweigpty. At tibie time of the 1947 U. N. Partition 
Resolution, Palestine was only the area whidi is presently the 
State of Israel, including the occupied areas except Sinai# 
live in the area, but to live tuxdar Arab rule. 
With Idle formation of tM United Nations, Palestine wut 
plaoed under the auspices of Great Britain. Problems had bema 
developing among the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine 
for many years, largely as a result of inoreased Jewish 
imilgration to the area and the Jewish desire to set up a 
Jewish state. The British Govmrzment had tried to limit Jewish 
immigration to the area, hoping to end the Moslem-Jewish ccm-
flicts. However, its action came too late, and only inoreased 
the Jewish populaticms determination to obtain its National 
Some. 
Consequently the British Government finally requested the 
aid of the United Nations in resolving the problems in the 
area. The "Question of Palestine" was placed on the General 
Assembly agenda at the Seoond Session of the United Nations. 
The iixab Bi^er C«DEdttee, representing the Arab population 
of Palestine, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, representing 
the Jewish population, were invited to send observers to supply 
su(^ information and to rend^ any assistance as mi^t be 
required. Both groups accepted the invitation. 
Two plans evolved from the Assembly* s work. The minority 
plan called for a unitary Arab-Jewish State set up on a system 
of cantons, much as the government of Switzerland is today. The 
majority plan called for the creation of two States—one Arab 
and one Jewish—Awm the territory of Palestine, with a provision 
for eoonomio union between the two states. 
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Tb& majority plan became General Assembly Resolution l8l(ll). 
However, no Arab government £kvt>red this plan. 
At the time of partition, the Jems ware a minority in 
o 
Palestine. The Az^bs, having voiced their desire for a unitazy 
state, refused %ù aooept "tiie General Assembly* s deoision; ^e 
Jews were detarmined to defend #At had been ^ven thma by the 
International Goamunity, Thus, in 194B, war broke out between 
the nevly ore&ted Jewish State and its Arab neighbors. As a 
result of both Arab and Jewish urging, the Arab inhabitants 
of Palestine fled to the surrounding Arab states. Those #10 
fled felt assured of a speedy return -to their homes as so<m as 
the Arab a3W.es defeated Isi^el. Eowev@P, Israel %»s not 
defeated, aM on May 11, 1949, was admitted to Aill manAmrship 
in the United Nations. Beoause Israel was not defeated, the 
problems iAi<A resulted from the creation of the Jewish State 
have persisted to the present. 
From the time of the admission of Israel to the United 
Bâtions, the General Assmibly and its various ommlttees have 
been a deWting foxum for both the Arab and Israeli re^peswtam. 
tlves. Much of this debate has concerned the Implementation of 
the 1940 General Assaably Resolution 194(111), and particularly 
of paragpa]^ 11»^ This Resolution outlined a solution to the 
2 
At the m&d of I946, there ware approximately 608,000 Jews 
in Palestine, making up 32.^^ of the pofulatltm. (See United 
Nations, Gmieral Assembly, Offlolal Eetx^d# (hereinafter referred 
to as QAOR). United Rations Speoial Committee <m Palestine, Volume 
I, Supplement Ko. 11, September 3, 1947, P# 11* 
%ee Appendix i). 
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situation whidh followd the 1948 <«ar. Pasragraph 11 outlined 
a solution to the reA^gee situation. 
While the Arab and Israeli delegates have been debating, 
many foromr Arab Palestinians have been existing in refugee camps, 
mainly in the Arab nations surrounding Israel.^ «phey have been 
oared for primarily by the United Hâtions. Their maintenance 
was temporarily the respozmibility of the United Hâtions Eelief 
for Palestine EeAigees (UREPR), This body became Ijie mare 
permanent United Katioim Relief and x^txcka Agen<^ for Palestine 
EeAigees in the Hear aast (UBHWA) i^en it became evident that 
there wcmld be no gtiick solution to the Palestine problan or 
to the refugee pPobl«n. 
Through the years, USEWÂ has, despite often adverse oonditiozm, 
provided quite admirably for the basic health, shelter and 
subsistence needs of the refugees* Ho^vever, in the line of 
projects to furtWr the developi^nt of the Middle Eastern host 
countries and to bring about the social and economic integration 
of ̂ e refugees into the area, the Agency has all but failed. 
At the Pour^ Sessiwi of the U. H. in 1949» the General 
Assembly made provision for the United Hâtions Conciliation 
Commission for Palestine.^ This body urns to act as a mediator 
between the Ax&h States and Israel in resolving differences 
and facilitating the repatriation or compensation of the refugees. 
%ee Appemdiz 0. 
^General Assembly Eesolution 3(%(I7). 
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Failure ham been tdie fortune of the Conciliation CcHBodssion* 
The C(xml8#l<m has faoed an almost hopeless task. The Isamieli 
officials feel that the Cosaoission is prejudioed toward ih@ 
Arab States, and the Arab officials feel that the G («mission 
is not only worthless^ but also on the aide of Israel* 
Following almost twwaty years of Arab—Israeli deadlock, 
the goveMmmits of both sides did finally agree to the solution 
outlined in the 196? Security Council Besolution,^ Howev®?, the 
Eesolutdon was so vagiely phrased and open to interpretation 
that each side ctmld read in what it desired. Thou^ there ims 
mgreesmit to the printed word, the opposing interia^etations 
have thus far kept any implementation of the Resolution frœn 
being realised» 
For the first ten y^sscn of their exile, the refugees were 
heavily dependent on the Arab Govarmmnts to do their negotia-» 
ting and to voice their opinions. For the most part, the 
Palestinians remained passive, although! embittered against 
Israel, and waited to a<^eve the implementation of fieeolution 194(111 
During the 1960*8, initially with the encouragement of 
several Arab host states, the refugees have be<x)me more organised 
and have gained both political and military récognition in the 
Middle East. The reftigee organisations also have their own 
political goals. These centm" around the liberation of Palestine. 
As mill be ahoisn, much of today* s tension in the area is a result 
of refiigee att^pts to implement their goal of refining Palestine. 
^See Appmidiz E. 
GHâPTSH II 
îm ARABS AM) TEii IbEàÊLIS 
Althoui# tWay the Palestinian Arabs are the main group 
blocking a settlement of the Middle Baat conflict, their 
influence has not always been so gzxmounoed. From 1947 until 
ap^arozimately 1^0, the conflict mjs centered more around 
diBagreements between the iirab and Israeli governments* Until 
the i960* s, except for the conflicts in 194Ô and 19561 lailitaa^ 
activities were gmierally subordinated to diplomatic dis— 
agreeamnts* Yet, diplomatic disagremient was not simply twow 
Bid# between the Israeli officials and the Arab officials# 
The Arab Govwnmmts themBelvee ware unable to agree on a solu­
tion* This governmental dlsagreenent* and consequent prolongation 
of the Palestiitô problem, was mxa major factor in bringing about 
the rise in InjO-umice of the Palestinians themselves* Had the 
govenmmits involved been able to reach a diplomatic agreement 
in the earlier stages of the conflict, they very likely could 
have imposed it on lAe refugees and brought about peace, rather 
than having created the present military situation* 
Yet, despite the fact that the îliddle iâast wnflict is no 
longer solely between the Governments of the Arab States and 
Israel, it semas newssary to look at the political positions of 
the Governments involved both to show how these Governments, more 
by in&otlon than aotioa, enoouraged, the greamit situation, and 
to show the oonfliots between #Le refugees' a^aas and goals and 
those of the Middle Eastern governments. 
The oreati<m of the State of Israel oaused t±te exodus of 
nearly one millitm Arabs ftcm ^e area mhidii had foM^ly bee» 
Palestine, The presenoe of these refugees in the Arab States 
beoame a faotor of major eoonœnio and sooiaCL disruption, Bearly 
one-half of the refugees still live in overpo^lated mreas 
#iere vcxrk opportunities are virtually nonexistent. These 
refugees have little hope of ever becoming self-supporting, at 
least under the presmit eooncmio struoture in the Middle d&st.^ 
Sinoe 1949, the Arab Governments have generally claimed 
that the reAigee problem is the most pressing laroblem in the 
Palestine oonfliot and that it must be resolved before disoussiozm 
can begin on other outstanding issues such as the pezsaanmit 
delimitation of boundaries, Wi# the exception of Jordan, tJto 
Arab governments maintain that Israeli officials must accept the 
ri^t of the refugees to retona home. However, the Arab 
Governments hars yet to grant Israel political recognition as 
a sovweign state, despite the State's twenigr—two year md.8tmi(*. 
Thus, Israeli officials have been unwilling to discuss solutions 
to the refugee w Palestine problems, 
Heither Arab nor Israeli officials want to make the concessions 
^GAOH, 6th Session, Assistance to Palestine Refugees, 
Interim Eepwt of the Director of the United Hâtions Belief and 
forks Ageiicy for Palestine Refugees in tSm Bear East (A/145I/ 
Eav. 1), Supplenent Humber 19, 195I, p. 13, 
neœesary to break the political deadlock* Both sides have oome 
to agree that the situation as is cannot centime indefinitely, 
but neither want» to surrender its possible political advantages 
and begin a oomiapomiae. 
Until 1967» the Arab and Israeli governments based their 
positions largely on interpretations of the 1948 Genwal Assembly 
Resolution 194(111) which outlined a solution to the refugee 
question. One facet of this Resolution proposed allowing the 
refugees a choice betwemi repatriation to their old homes now 
in Israel or resettlement in the Arab countries or elsewhere. 
Israeli authorities have refused to acknowledge en masse 
repatriation of the refugees as a possible solution. The goverom-
ment claims that repa^iation is qualified by practicality and 
regional peace* Because of the influx of Jewish imxigpcante, 
nmny Axxn the Arab countries, repalsriatioaa is impractical. Peace, 
obviously, does not exist. Israeli officials seriously douot 
that, if repatriated, the refugees would be loyal oitizms. They 
strongly question whether any state could be required to do that 
2 
whidx is inconsistent with its own survival. 
The Israeli delegates to the United Hâtions point out that 
if the Arab Governments ^%ly wanted the State of Israel to 
repatriate the refugees or pay compensation to those not choosing 
2„ ,^0 c,—4— A J II— ^ tioal Oommittee, 3$th 
Israeli Position 
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to return, they would end their eoonoEdo boycotts against Israel 
and would agree to enter into direct negotiations, an Israeli 
government prerequisite for any soluticm.^ 
The Israeli delegates have pointed out that in 1949 their 
government did agree to tfUce bac^ 100,(KX3 refugees# The off«p 
#as not even acknowledged by the Arab GkysnarzuzwMilxB*'^ Again in 
1957, the Israeli Government offered to attempt a large-scale 
repatriation endeavor, {X>nditi<aial on Israel's administration 
of the Gaaa Strip. This offer, too, #a8 ignored»^ How, except 
for reunifi(*ition of families and a few special cases, Israel* s 
^svermmt rejects any large scale repatriation of the refugees. 
Israeli delegates provide several reasons for the rejec­
tion of repatriation as a solution* The State of Israel has 
accepted and integrated himdreds of thousands of Jews frtm around 
6 
the world and ttmi the neighboring Arab States. Acceptance of 
these Jews, oomblned with the belief that 60^ of the refugees 
in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon have been resettled by spontaneous 
absorpticaa" leads officials to believe that the refugee problem 
is not so great as the Arab Govwnments claim.^ Also by 1956, 
over of the refugee population was undw 15 years of age. 
^GAOB. 18#L Session, Special Political Committee, 410th 
Meeting (November 15, 19o3)» p. 18?# 
8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Oammlttee, 29th 
Meeting (Bovemb«p 11, 1953)» P. 142. 
^A. G. IWzerik, ed., Arab Refugees in the Middle East 
(Hew York* International Eevl'ew Seivioe, 19^8), p. 3. 
^GAOii. 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Gmmittee, 29th 
Meeting (Novembw 11, 1953), p. 142* 
^GAOB. 14th Session, Special Political Committee, l62nd 
Meeting IKovember 30, 1959), P. 164. 
"•10» 
Most of these younger refugees have no oonsoious memory of 
Palestine and wK?e not even Palestinian oitizens.^ 
The Israeli Gfovemment prefers a solution based on reset­
tlement and compensation of the refugees. This solution semis 
to be more natural in view of the similarities of language, 
cailture and religion between the refugees and the Arab hosts, 
Israeli officials feel.^ This alternative has also been 
a stalewited issue. 
The Israeli Governmmt, in 1950, agreed to the j^inoiple 
of oonipensation for lands and buildings abandoned by the 
Palestinians. Most of these lands and buildings were occupied 
and used by the ino<mlng Jews. Sinoe -tiie I956 V/ar, the Govern-
maat has linked consideration of the oœnpensation issue to the 
abandoommit by the Governments of the Arab States of their 
10 
eooncmlG boycott against Israel. Thou^ the Arab Govewunents* 
claims #at Israel's treasury is accruing large sums from this 
abandoned propez^, the Israeli Government counters that it 
has had to invest large anKnmts to reclaim much of the property. 
The former Palestinians also abandoned large sums in bank 
holdings. The Israeli Government, throu^ the auspices of the 
Conciliation Ctxomission, did finally release the majority of 
8 
GAQ£. 13th Session, Special Political Coosaittee, 106th 
Meeting (Novwiber 17, 1958), p. 84# 
^GAOR. 15th Session, Special Political Committee, 106th 
Meeting (Sovember 17, 1958), p. 83. 
^^Meaerik, op. cit.. p. 8, and GAQB. 8th Session, .id Hoc 
Political Committee, 29th Meeting (November 11, 1953)» P» 144# 
^^GAOB. 15th Session, Special Politioal Committee, 250th 
Meeting (April 14, 1961)» p. Ill, 
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these holdings*, including nKmies deposited in accounts and the 
contents of safety deposit bo2:es* However, it considered the 
release «us a concession and expected some corresponding action 
frim the Arab Governments, %ho considered this release as an 
12 
obligation and duty on the part of the Israeli Government. 
ThoUi^ ̂ ese accounts were returned directly to their ownws, 
Israeli officials maintain t|%at their release does not set a 
precedent on the compensation issue* Bather, any cwQpensation 
must be paid to a reintegration fund so that all of the rej^gees 
will benefit rather than just those Wio ornnoà property in 
Palestine. Most of the former property owers, Israeli officials 
feel, do not truly need the monies anymay»^^ Israeli officials 
also insist that the value of the property appropriated by the 
Arab States frcm their foxmer Jewish residmits should be determined 
before arriving at axty final figures on lAich wmpemsation is 
to be paid. The value of the Jewish property would be 
deducted from the value of the Arab property abandoned in Israel.^^ 
The Israeli Government also has specific ideas of methods 
of achieving a settlamnt. The Government maintains that no 
substitute exists for a peace Ail settleiwnt of disputes by direct 
negotiations. Until Arab and Israeli representatives can nego-
19 
Don Perets, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (i/ashington 
D. C.I The Middle East Institute, 1950), p. 237. 
15th Sessitm. Ad Hoc Political Committee, 35th 
Meeting (November 7, 1950), p. 214* 
6th Session, Progress Eeport of the United Nations 
Conciliation 0(«mission for Palestine (A/1985), Supplanent 
Number I8, p. 1. 
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tiate direotly on an ov&rall peace eettlmmmt, possibly W.th the 
refugee situatia» as the first item to be considered, there wiU 
tiatiens are hampered by the Arab Governments* refusals to grant 
political reco^aition to Israel, This idea of negotiations 
between governments has nevar been imdi^ed by the Israeli 
officials to include -&e Palestine Arabs* 
Syrian delegates to the General AsseoAly have consistently 
maintained that repatriaticm ie the only solution to the refugee 
problem. In reply to Israeli delegates* contentions that the 
clock cannot be i%it back five, ten or twenty years in order to 
allow a return of the ref^igees, Syrian delegates have ramponded 
that Israel owes its existence to the clock* s being put back 
2,(X30 years*The delegates maintain tm^t the decisitm to 
return or to accept cmapensation cannot be arbitraily decided 
by the Conclliati<m Coxmissicm, the United Nations or any one 
gcvwmaent involved* The refugees must, ii]^vidually, be 
givwi ocwapletely free choice betweesn re^mtriation or resettlement 
with otmpensation. Fear each refugee is entitled to a choice 
under General Assembly Resolution 194(111)*^? 
As a general observation, Syrian representatives have 
^^GAOR, l8th Session, Special Political Committee, 410th 
Meeting (November 15» 1963), p. 181* 
l6 
G AOS. 7 th Sessimi, Ad Hoc Political Oomnlttee, 30th 
Meeting (December 2, 1952), p, 175» 
17«/,,^» cii. L.—a— »j «— "-•'.itical Committee, 63rd 
never be much hope for Middle Eastern peace 
Syriaa Position 
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mintained that the entire Palestine problem is the respcmsi— 
bility of the United Kations. Since the U, H, perpetrated the 
problem by partitioning Palestine, it oannot withdraw its 
program of assistanoe, althou#i its relief program is only a 
s t o p g a p , I f  t h e  U n i t e d  R a t i o n s  c a n  p e r s u a d e  I s r a e l i  o f f i c i a l s  
to pexiait the refugees to return home, the problem oan at least 
be reduced to negligible j^oportions, and probably would oease 
to exist. In the meantime, the Syrian delegates, at least 
vooally, support the Agency programs as they help to imgrove 
refugee living wnditions and to save the refugees from ofmplete 
19 
moral degredaticm and physical deterioration* ^ 
Syrian representatives, like those fr<m other Arab States, 
in resisting any solution except repatriation, claim to be only 
safeguarding the ri^t of the refugees as guaranteed by the 
United Mations, 3o far as considering any other solution, it 
would be illusory vdthout taking into account this rig^t of the 
refugees. Until the Israeli Government agrees to the imple­
mentation of jg»reviou8 U. H. resolutions, and particularly to the 
solution outlined in Eesolution 194(111), there can be no 
20 
basis for negotiations. 
Syrian representatives do admit that no one denies the right 
of a state to decide whether immigration constitutes a threat 
5th session. Ad Boo Political Gomnittee, 34th 
Meeting (Bovmnber 6, 1950), P« 205» 
7th Session, 391st Plenary Meeting (Novanber 6, 
1950), p. 131. 
^^GAQH. 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political C(xnmittee, 27th 
Meeting (Wovembeir 6, 1953) * P» 129# 
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to the security of a State. However, even this ri^t would 
not apply in the case of Ispe al where the refugees would just 
21 
be crossing the border to reenter their own country. 
The Syrian representatives have noted in U. K. debates 
that the inweasing eoonomio development of the host countries 
would provide a greater opportunity for paid work by a large 
i 
number of the refugees. However, they have also oautioned that 
these opportunities should not be closely linked with the 
rehabilitation of the refugees or made (dependent on it, <a? 
political complications mi^t arise such as those which have 
prevented the ii^ilmwntatitm of various large-scale works 
projects during the years. 
Oa. the subject of c^qiensatlan, the Syrian dele^tes feel 
that Ittpaeli officials have applied so imny reservations and 
conditions as to mmunt to a refusal to pay* They also feel that 
the Israeli Govermient intends to use the compmisation issue to 
force the Arab States to negotiate œa Israeli As 
stated by one Syrian Calegate in 1950, "Israel's ^jvemn^nt is 
prepared to distmss compezmation, but not to take measures to 
bring it about,*'^^ This feeling has persisted to the present. 
91 
GAQË. 9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 36th 
Meeting (Sovember 29, 1954)» P» 168# 
po 
GAOB. 11th Session, Special rolitioal Committee, 29th 
Meeting (February 20, 1957), p. 134. 
5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Conaaittee, 66th 
Meeting (December 1, 1950), p. 430* 
^^GACIf, 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 68th 
Meeting (iieceiaoer 4» 1950), p. 441. 
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A3 for iixab property in Israel, there should be e receiver to 
collect any rent or revenue f.*ora the property. The money collected 
uould be applied toward reducing the U, N, relief budget. Such 
action would be justified, since at the time of PartitiCMi, Israel, 
or the Jewish population of Palestine, possessed only of 
the land area in Palestine. The remainder of the property and 
land still belongs to the refugees, who ere now living on inter— 
25 
national charity. Compensation, as against income from the 
proper-^, is the right of an individual owner, however, and 
cannot be tunaed over to a reintegration fund.^^ The Israeli 
Government's excuse of financial problems and economic boycotts 
as reasons for not paying compensation are equally invalid. The 
economy of Israel is based on Arab wealth and property and on 
27 
donations ficon the international oonmunity. 
The Syrian delegates have felt that the Jewa are attempting 
to use the refugee problem as a bar fining factor in their 
quest for further tœrritorial expansion. This is bome out by 
the annexation of the Casa Strip being a condition of an Israeli 
repatriation offer, as the acquisition of more territory was 
28 
the only way Israel could absorb so many extra persons. Bven 
if the refugees are economically inte^ated into the host 
^^GAOR. 9th Session, Special Political Conmittee, 30th 
Meeting (November 22, 1954), P. 137* 
^^GAOR, 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Conmittee, 63rd 
Meeting (November 30» 1950)» P* 408# 
9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Coimnittee, 36"tti 
Meeting (November 29, 1954)» P. 169. 
28 
GAPE. 4th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 54th 
Meeting (November 22, 1954), p. 138. 
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countries, aa Israeli officials v/ould like, they are still 
refugees aa long as they ara unablo to return home, according to 
29 'n representatives. 
Though the Syrian Government is probably the niost militant 
of the four main ilrab host governments, the other three states 
involved are equally adamant on many of the issues, Hone of the 
/irab States is willing to take responsibility for the beginnings 
of the conflict. Before 1967, no host government acknowledged 
a permanent solution other than repatriation, Bor are any yet 
willing to begin individual negotiations with the Israeli 
Government, 
ii^gVDtiaa Position 
i)gyptian delegates feel that little honest attanpt has 
been lUide to solve the refugee problem, but believe that as 
long as the refugees are kept f^om their homes, they are the 
responsibility of the United Nations. The delegates also 
claim that Jewish ImnigratlKm has been a calculated move by 
Israeli Zionists to rid Israel of its Arabs and to prevent their 
return. In-migration of Jews has made the Implementaticm of 
various U, N, resolutions impossible.^ 
The refugee problem was a direct consequence of the inte3>-> 
vention of the United Nations in the Palestine conflict and the 
^^GAOH. 9th ïàession, Ad Hoc Political Comnlttee, 30th 
Meeting (November 22, 1954), P« 138. 
OIL# 1 #h oession, Special Political Gœmnittee, 131st 
Meeting (November 13, 1959), P« 114# 
^GAOfi, 9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Gwmlttee, 31et 
Meeting (November 23, 1954), P» 139* 
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U. E., together with Israel, will remain responsible until a 
just and lasting solution is found, according to the .Egyptian 
r r -tentative. The question of relief, one issue of the larger 
problem, should be considered as a political, rather than a 
humanitarian, matter, Follov/ing this line of reasoning, the 
Egyptian spokesmen have not hesitated to criticize UMV/A, from 
its slender budget to its proposed rehabilitation and reset­
tlement projects. An Egyptian delegate in 1952 stated that the 
economic development of the Mddle (vast was the affair of the 
states in the area; they should be left to work out their own 
plans without foreign interference,^ Some of this "fOTeiga 
interference" refers to the eocistenoe of the State of Israel, 
Egyptian officials have also maintained that the presence 
of the refugees in all of the host countries has imposed a 
great hardship on these countries. The refugees* presence has 
brought a considerable drop in wages and in overall standards 
of living. To support this contention, the Egyptian delegate 
pointed out that in Palestine the minimum daily wage of an 
agricultural worker had been $1,00, In Jordan in 1953» the 
comparable wage was 1,28, end in the Gaza Strip, 1,15»^^ Althou^ 
much is made of the miserable conditions in which the refugees 
live, little mention is ever made, at least by the Arab 
^GAQR, 6th Session, Ad Hoc Political Conanittae, 44th 
Meeting (January 18, 1952), p, 247# 
^^GAQR, 8^ Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 25th 
Meeting (Kovera'oer 4, 1953), P« 120. 
•^n 1953 eaWi refugee received relief from UElt.VA amounting 
to i,03 per day. Five cents of this amount was spent on food. (See 
rôi>resentatives, of the ixgeacy's often r^paated contention that 
the refugees have a standard of living and an education somewhat 
- than that of most of the inhabitants of the host states. 
"Ê^ptian officials have also criticized the ConcHiatioa 
Coimniasion* s efforts to obtain the release of blocked accounts, 
calling this step an inversion of the logical order in dealing 
ftlth the refugee problem by placing it before the questions of 
repatriation and compensation. 
Lebanese roslticm 
Lebanese repress ta tives feel that the problem of the 
reftigees involves an entire people deliberately displaced from 
their homes and replaced by alien elements from abroad. They 
maintain that the refugee problem is the core of a dispute 
involving millions of people and is constituting a definite 
37 
danger to world peace. The time element «Aioh some hoped 
would bring about a solution seans only to have provided for more 
GAOË. 8th Session. Ad Hoc Political Committee, 25th Ifeeting 
"(ÏÏomnber 4, 1953), p. 119.) By I966 the allowance for food­
stuffs was $1.20 per pwson per month or about $.04 per day, 
(See GAOB. 21st session, neport of the G(mnissioner-General 
of the United Nations Belief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Hear jawt (A/6313), Supplement Number 13, 1966, 
p. 8.) 
^^GAOR. 7th Session, Ad Hoc Political Cosamittee, 25th Meeting 
(NovembOT 25» 1952), p. I50. 
^GAQR. 11th oession. Special Political Camlttee, 31st 
Meeting (February 21, 1957)» P» 145* 
15th Session, Speoiail Political Consnittee, 200th 
Meeting ^N^ovember 25, I960), p. I48. 
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bittornesa,^ The Israeli representatives' implications tiiat 
the Govomment has the right to permit the refugees to return 
' "hair homes, or not to return, is in no way supported in 
59 
pertinent U. N. resolutions, Israeli delegates' arguments 
against repatriation oecause moot of the refugees are too young 
to remember ralestine is strange logic, Lebanese representative» 
feel, coming from representatives of a state most of whose 
inhabitants are recent immigrante from abroad, and who are 
claiming a land because it belonged to their ancestors ovot 
2,000 years ago.^ Plus, riuoh of the land occupied by the 
Israeli military after the 1948 War, (and a^in after the 195^ 
and 1967 ïars) is a direct violation of the provisions in the 
original partition Resolution.'^ 
î.obanes© representatives have stated that the ri^t of 
repatriation is a vested ri^t of the refugees, and the iirab 
States have no way to dispose of that rig^t# A rehabilitation 
program to equip the refugees for resettlement is neither a final 
nor a permanent solution to the question. Jven if the projects 
were carried out, the only problem which would be solved would 
be the relief problem. The works projects can never imply any 
^gAOR, 11th Session, Special Political Gomoittee, 3l8t 
Meeting (February 21, 1957)» P* 145* 
^^GAOH, 14th Session, Special Political Committee, 152nd 
Meeting (Zmvember 16, 1959) # P# 118, 
^^GAOH. 13th Session, Special Political Committee, 109tii 
Meeting (November 20, 1958), p. 102, 
^GA02. ?th Session, 503rd Plenary Meeting (December 4» 
1954), p. 351. 
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surrender of the refugee#* ri^t to repatriation. 
Lebanese delegates, like those of othw Arab States, do not 
insist ao. faoe to fiaoe negotiations vith ̂ e Israelis* In faot, 
they argue that the United Nations should take steps to solve the 
refugee problem in line with General Assaobly 2#solutioim, but 
wil&out direct negotiations.The Arabs, according to Lebanese 
representatives, are basing their positions on legal considérati(ms, 
Wiile the Israelis are recognising only tiie de facto situaticm*^ 
The Israeli Government* s refusal to allow #ie refugees to return 
is based on the Zionist intent to create a Jewish State, hostile 
to all nrnimJewlsh elements. The oriMitlmi of a Jewish State is 
also Intended to justify expansionist ̂ litios to the world and 
to make further conquest appear inevitable, 
Jordanian PositiaB 
The Jordanian Government, tWu^ iwobably the most willing 
of the hosts to include the refugees in its national life, still 
feels much the same as the other host w)untries. The q.ue8ti<m of 
the ri^ts of the refugees should take precedence over the 
question of regional peace.^ With reference to the militant 
^GAOB. 9th Sesslw, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 38th 
Meeting (Bovember 30, 1954)» P. 178. 
6th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 44th 
Meeting (January 18, 1952), p. 245# 
'HgaCS, 7th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 28th 
Meeting (Sovwaber 29, 1952), p. 159* 
^%AOB« 9th Session, Ad Boo Political Committee, 36th 
Meeting (November 29# 1954)* P, 170* 
^GAQE. 17th Session. Special Political Committee, 360th 
Meeting (Dewmber 3, 1962;, p. 179. 
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refugee groupa, or fedayeen, the Jordanian representative drew 
the parallel that if the "fedayeen are dis-torbing Israel, Israel 
in turn is disturbing the whole Arab world." 
For the Jordanian Gorwnmmit, the Palestine problmi has 
three main aspectsi the refugees, the territorial i%roblem, and 
the problem of otmpensation. Beoause the attempts to settle the 
refugee problwi have been made without reference to the terri­
torial aspects of the probl^ no suooess has been aohieved*^ 
Israel's Government opened its frontiers to immigrants and 
had settled than <m lands and in the hoams of the former Arab 
populaticm* Peace in the area would be threatened until the 
Israeli Government abandoned that policy, acoording to Jordanian 
delegatesIsraeli officials' motivation in the release of 
accounts nas not espeoially noble or generous, but was the 
result of îwessure by the United KingdU»a and the banks which 
had branches in the Arab Stat#» and were being threatrnwd with 
having their holdings impounded. 
Bents earned from former Palestinians' lands should be 
plawd in a special fund for the benefit of the refugees, pending 
a final settlement. If Israeli officials refused to cooperate 
11^ Session, 644th Plenary Mwting (Januaiy 28, 
1957), pT#?, 
"^GAQR. 12th Session, Special Political Owomittee, 69th 
Meeting (Hoveabar 26, 1957)» P* 122, 
^%AQR. 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Tlat 
Meeting (iiecember 6, 1950) t P» 457* 
16th Session, Spe^al Political Owmlttee, 320^ 
Meeting (Decmaber 16, 1961), p. 322« 
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with a oustodiaa of such a fund, the membw states, which so 
generously respond to Zionist appeals for funds, oould deduct the 
same eumunts from these funds and apply this money directly to 
the benefit of the refugees, 
Five points were listed by the Jordanian i epresentative in 
195Î es being essential to any solution. If anything, these five 
points have become even more important aftar the 196? «/art 
1* The establishmemt of a United Nations ofxaamissicm 
for the oustodiansMp of Arab property in Isra^* 
2* Return of the Arabs to that part of Palestine ̂ lich 
the U* H« had decided would raomin Arab tera^tory* 
3* Repatriation of those refugees wishing to return* 
4. Paymmt of compensation to the others. 
% The establishmMKt of intmrnation^ control of 
2iioniat insaigratitm into Israel.^ 
Summary 
Thou^ Arab representatives are agreW^ that the refugees 
should be given a choice between return or «mpmamatitm, and 
that the responsibility for the refugees* welfare until a settle­
ment is reached belong to Israel and to the United Hâtions, they 
do zuot agree on all of the o16er issues involve. Bach seems to 
be placing its own desires above other considerations. For 
example, the j^gyptian Govwnment refused to accept Israel's 
offer for repatriaticm at least partly because the offer also 
required Israeli administratixm of the Gaga Strip* laa^ael now 
^^GAQfi* 12th Session, Special Political Gmmittee, 69# 
Meeting (Bovwnber 26, 1957)» P* 122. 
12th Session, Special Politioal Ccxmittee, 69th 
Meeting (Hovembar 26, 1957)» P* 123. 
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oooupiôs the S^lp. Jordan, having the most accessible border 
to Israel wants espeoially to limit Jewidbi imiigpati(m because 
of her own security needs, real or imagined. Jewish Immigration, 
to all of the Arab Governments, implies Zionist expansion. 
Jordanian officials feel that they could loose more and more 
territoxy. Thus, the Jordanian Government prefers to resolve 
the territorial issue before the compensation issue or even the 
total reAigee laroblem. 
An observation by Dr. Joseph Jj. Johnson, made on cme of 
his United Nations survey trips to the Middle East, gives one 
possible reason for the lack of ̂ wernmental diplomatic success 
during the past twenty years, fie notes that the Israeli leaders 
can and do take much the same positions in piblic as in private; 
Arab leaders, however, feel compelled to take strong and even 
eitreme stands in public, although they may hold less ezlarwie 
views privately.Israeli officials, basing their positimm 
on the de facto situaticm, thus seim more ctmfident of #eir 
positions than do their Arab counterparts. The Arab Governments, 
in revising to accept the de facto si^iation and basing their 
positions on the legality of United Hâtions resolutions, seem 
to be arguing fr%! a weaker position. i<\>r, though the reso­
lutions are binding, technically, they are in practice little 
BKxre tkan recommendations whose success is based on the acceptance 
of the parties involved. The Arab states representatives, too, 
^^iir. Joseph S. Johnson, ••Arab vs. Israeli,** Sm Outlook. 
February, 1964, p. 17. 
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are Ëur^îing not <mly for their governments, but also for the 
displaced Palestinians living in their countries. 
Yet, various other factors ai«i pressures semi to have had 
more influence on the Arab Governments* positions than on 
those of the Israeli Government, at least prior to the I967 
War* Few Arabs favored the creation of the Jewish State; no 
Arab State voted in favor of the Partition Hesolutioti. The 
Arab States have now suffered three military defeats and several 
have lost much of their productive or strategic territoiy. The 
Arab Goverzments have also had to contend directly with the 
restless and bitter Palestinians. Israel had only a handful until 
the 1967 
The Arab Govermmnts have been vividly aware of the refugee 
poi»ilations within their borders sinw 194B. The refugees residing 
in the Arab States have had a direct influence on many Arab 
statements and beliefs. The Arab Govemiz^ts have Izwistad on 
repatriation largely because this has been the refugees' desire* 
The Arab Governments have also refused to accept resettlement, for 
#ie refugees have been opposed to this solutxcm. However, by 196?, 
the Arab host goverzments did seem more willing to try to 
find a settlement* Mich of this (diange in their earlier, more 
adamant position was a direct result of the refugees' disruptive 
influence on several of the hoot countries* 
% 1967» two decades of dlsa^eement and diplomatic stale­
mate had allowed time for the Palestinians to becmne partially 
organized and to gain political status in the Middle iiiast. By 
this time they had definite goals. And Palestinian desire» ware 
différant from those of both the jlrab Governments and the Israeli 
Government# Two decades of inaction and exile were encm^ to 
prove to the Palestinians that the Arab Governments were not the 
allies the I'alestiniaos had hoped* Thus, Palestinian leaders, 
supported by the refugee masses, bs^n more and more to seek a 
solution independent of any government. 
CmPTEE III 
ÏHE PAllDSTIKIAÎJS ABD THE UHIT£i) MTIOHS 
The relationship between the Palestinian refugees and 
the United Hâtions has been one of political turmoil since 
1947* The humanitarian aspects have bew expected and exploited 
by both the Arab Governs^nts and by the refugees. As the 
United Nations Belief and »/orks Agency (UBHWA) was the only 
means the Palestinians had for political expression until 
recently, they often used and sabotaged UMÎWA probants as an 
indirect expression of their political positions• Idany of 
their positions, including the militancy of the oommando groups 
today, havB been expressed more indirectly for some time* Yet, 
it is not surprising that the refugees have only recently gained 
political recognition as a party involved in the Middle East 
conflict* 
In the middle 1940*8, the Arab population of Palestine 
was divided about ̂ 0^ rural and urban* Most of this urban 
gpoup-m-the professionals, educators and businessmen—had fled 
Palestine shortly before the 1948 iVar so that they would not 
be trapped by the events they fcKresav. About two-thirds of the 
urban Palestinians had skills needed in the Arab States and 
readily found employnmnt. These persons and their dependents, 
or about 20p of the total displaced, have never been reliant 
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on thu United. Nations*^ The refugees who have been oared for 
by the U. H, are, for the moat part, the agrarian population 
of Palestine a group tied to its land and suddenly v/ithout 
land or any other visible means of support. Beoause of the 
breaWovm in Palestinian social structure, brou^^t about by 
the exodus and resettlement of the Palestinian elite, this 
agrarian group has been left largely leaderless until the 
early I960* s, 
Shortly after the 194^ conflict, when it became evidmit 
that th&re would be no short—term solution to the refugee 
problem, the U. K# began taking steps to provide for this 
segment of the former Palestinian population* Despite its 
humanitarian endeavors, the U» B* has never been liked by the 
refugee population and has endured imch criticism f^om the 
2 
refugees# The definition of nho is a refugee has been one 
contested issue. The refugees, especially those in the camps, 
feel that the definition should also include the Bedouins, or 
Palestinian nomads, as well as the persons who lost either their 
homes or their livelihoods, but not both. Thou^ the modification 
of this definition has been proposed in the General ilssembly, 
no revision has yet bec» made* 
^AQB. 17th Session, Annual Eepoort of the Director of the 
United Nations Belief and /orks Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the gear East (A/5214), Supplément Humble I4, p. 2* 
^he United Hâtions has defined the term "refugee" to apply 
to those persons living in Palestine for two years prior to the 
wtbreak of the I94B conflict and isho lost both their homes and 
their livelihood as a result of the War. (See GAOB. 9th Session, 
Ad Hoc Political Committee, 29th Meeting (November 19, 195^4), P* 135») 
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However, just speaking of the refugees contained in the 
camps and supported by the United Nations does not seem to he 
entirely representative. The Agenqy Director stated in 196? 
that the number of persons in camps has never exceeded more 'Uian 
40jb of the total refugee population. ̂ This figure hsis varied 
onl5* sli^tly during the years as statistics show that in 1950 
one—third of the refugees were living in some 60 camps and the 
remainder were in the towns acwi villages of the host (xmntries.^ 
Typical of the refugees, both in and out of the camps, is 
the "refugee mentality which the Agency's Director noted in 
1954. Part of the "refugee mentality" results from the intense 
individualism of the Palestinians and their minimal sense of 
solidarity with their fellow Palestinians, Also typical is 
their passive expectation of continuous benefits,^ The 
refugees regard themselves as temporary wards of the inter­
national consmmity, which they hold respcmslble for their pli^t. 
They also feel this oonsmznity has a duty to enable them to 
return to their hemes. In the meantime, however, the refugees 
feel that the United Nations must provide for their welfare and 
%AOR, 5th Enmrgency Special Session, Report of the Secretary. 
General under General Assanbly Resolution 2252 (JS—V) and Securi^ 
Council Resolution 237 (196?)(A/6787), August 18, 1967. 
^SAOR, 6th Session, Report of the Director of the United 
Natloas Relief and V/orks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near Bast (A/1905), Supplement Number 16, p, 4* 
^bid.. p. 5. 
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6 meiintenanco. 
As early as 1952, the Director of the Agency noted that 
many of the refugees were ceasing to believe in a return to 
Israel, or Palestine, However, he stated that this feeling 
was not preventing them from insisting on a return. For, they 
fait that to agree to consider any other solution would be a 
7 
sign of weakness and a relinquishing of a fundammtal ri^t. 
l^hroug^ the years, the refuses have felt that any attempts 
to bring about their employment or reaettlm^nt would auto-
matioally mean an end to theix olaim for oompenmation or repatri— 
ati<m. Their distaste for nSBWÂ and its programs has been shown 
by their laok of partiqipati<m in -ost instanoes* 
The refugees themselves feel that today's iwoblem is a 
political one. Mr* Izsat Tannous of the Palestine Arab Refugee 
Office end a Arequmit participant in the United Hâtions debates 
on the Palestine problwa has stated that the problma is not 
simply an eoonomio one open to an eoon«nio solution. The problem 
he feels cannot be settled siogply by canpensating the refugees 
and integrating them into the lands outside of what was Palestine.^ 
Such solutions ignore the yearning and attachment of the Falestinp-
^GAQR. 13th Session, Report of the Gcmmissioner-General of 
the United Nations Belief and ./orks Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East (a/5513). Supplement Number 13, p. 3# 
"^GAQjR. 6th Session, Report of the Director of the United 
Nations Belief and ./arks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near Sast (A/I905), 3upplem«at Number 16, p. 5* 
^ .litioal Committee, 29t& 
Political Position 
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Isas for their village©, farms ajad social environmentB# 
In 1961, the Agency Director stated that the feelings of 
the refugees and of the local populaoe in the Arab host states 
were generally parallel on the Palestine issue. In both segments, 
he noted, bitterness and resentment were sispong. The Director 
contiïmud that it was difficult to detect much difference 
between the vietvs of the refiit'^ees who had been employed and 
eel f-supporting for thirteen years and those ?Ao had beœi 
languishing in oaxaps, or between these two groups and "Hie nœa-
Arab refugees living in the Arab host states. Nor oould he 
find evidence of a different feeling among the younger and the 
older refugees. He also pointed out that for thirte^ years, 
the feelings of the refugees had been oharaoterized by frustrac­
tion, uncertainty, disappointment and hardship. In his opinion, 
it was hardly a mtter of surprise if these refugees were 
embittered and resentful and if they clamorred to return to 
Palestine. He also expressed no surprise -Uiat they would be 
9 
supported politically by the Arab Govemmmits, 
The refugee representatives idio have participated in the 
annual Palestine debates feel that the Palestine probl«n is & 
case of colonialism in its ugliest foMa, llr, làaile Ghory, the 
delegate of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office, in I96I stated 
%AQB« l6th Session, Annual Report of the Director of the 
United Nations Belief and V/orks Agency for Palestine fiefu^es in 
#ie Hear Bast (A/486I), Supplawnt Number I4, p* 2, 
that novyhere outside of Palestine had imperialism displaced and 
expelled an indigenous population ftom its homeland.^® Being 
part of a developing area, the refugees' attitudes toward 
colonialism were undarstandable, and the refugees' insistence 
that the colonialist situation replacing a prior colonialist 
situation be ended was hardly surprising, Thou#i this feeling 
had been latent since 194Ô, it is being Repressed more and more 
during the I960's. 
Thou^ the refugees have no liking for the U, H,, <aae 
of the possible solutions proposed by Mr, Ghory in I96I was 
to use peaceful means through the U. H# Charter and inter­
national law az^ jiistioe* The reftxgees, like the Arab Gorerav-
ments, tend to place a great de^ of earphasis, thou^ no 
particular hope, on a legal method of solution. The other po8*> 
sible solution Mr. Ghory mentioned in 1^1 ims the i»ay of forw# 
He added that the refugees hoped the tJ* H. would not ooa^el them 
to use force, but if the organization proved unable to bring 
about a jizst settlement, the refugees would be obligated to 
liberate their country themselvesThus, the refugees did 
forewarn the United Nations and the world (Ximmunity of their 
current disruptive role and militant tactic#. 
Mr. Ghory also stated that the Palestine problem ima a 
conflict between the Zionist invadmrs and the Arabs of Palestine# 
Thus, he, like Israeli officials, is making a two-sided issue 
^%AOE. 16th Session. Special Political Cornait tee, 311th 
îtoeting (December 7, 196I), p. 264. 
^4bid. 
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oi" the problens. Yet he, and the refugees, feel that the 
controversy is bet.vaen the i'alestiniana and the State of Israel. 
The Israeli officials profex- to keep the problem on a governmen­
tal level—between the Governcvents of Israel and the iirab States. 
Thou^ the refugees welcome ̂ irab governmental assistance and 
conoei'u, mr* Ghory continued that the Palestinians regard the 
problem as essentially a mattor ./hich they themselves must 
settle. The Palestinians have felt that the Arab States 
would never exploit the refugee problem to further their own 
12 ends, however. Still, the refugees are more and more caning 
to believe that the Arab Governments have not done eiiou^ to 
bring about an agreeable solution. 
Regarding finances, lïr. Ghory states that there is no need 
to resort to charity to finance ule./a. Bather, a simple act of 
justice would suffice. Turn over the lands and property of the 
refugees to a custodian vdio \irould administer them and see that 
the revenues ware paid to the legitimate owners. In fact, 
the Palestinians would wslcome the appointment of such a person 
by the United Hâtions. 
In i960 the Palestinian representative at the Cœmnitte© 
debates declared that thu hopes of the refugees had recently 
been rejuvenated. They had come to believe that the U. K. had 
GAQR. I6th Session. Special Folltioal Gcmnlttse, 311th 
feting (December 7, 1961), p.264» 
^^bid,. p. 263. 
^'^AOE. 15th Session, Special Political CcMomittee, 202nd 
Meeting (November 17, I960), p. 126. 
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changed substantially sinoe 1947 and would no longer tolerate 
a situation whioh prevented the Palestinians from returning to 
their homes. This ohange was brought about by the inoreasing 
United Hâtions m^beœship from the third world in Asia and in 
Afrioa whioh could sympathize with the Palestinians in their 
IS 
fight against oolonialism. ̂  However, the Palestinian repre» 
santatives have also shorn their pessimism hy repeating the 
contention ^ïat the U. N. has a moral duty to attend to the 
refugees' needs by continuing to provide for their subsistence. 
Thus, though the U. N. created the ixroblem but is unable to solve 
it, the United Rations still is, according to the refugees, held 
responsible for perpetuating it by supporting the displaced 
Palestinian population. 
At the 17th Session, the Palestinian spokesmen declared 
the Palestinians to bo & peaceful people who insisted on a just 
peaoe.^^ With reference to the Jem occupying Palestine, the 
representative outlined these feelings* 
1. The Jewish authorities had no rights in the 
occupied areas of Palestine other than those of 
a tmaporary belligerent occupant and as admin­
istrators under the lav/s of war. They had no 
sovereignty. 
2. International law uphcB. the principle that pri­
vate property was inviolable and that all enoraooh-
raents on i>roperty constitutsd a vrax crime, 
3. The Jewish authorities had oosmitted and had been 
accessories in the coraadssion of acts against Zirab 
private property and public assets which instituted 
^G-aQS. 15th oQssion, Special . olitical Conuoittee, 202nd 
Meeting (November 17, I960), p. 126. 
^^GAQE. 16th làession, Special x'olitioal Committee, 31dth 
Meeting (December 15, I96I), p. 305. 
-34-
war orimma as reoognized by interoatloml law and 
the United Hâtions. 
4» Jewish authorities had x^ped advantages traa their 
unlawful aots and (wuld not deny the ri^ts of the 
Arabs to possess and enjoy suoh property and assets. 
5* The United Hâtions was legitimately and morally 
bound to reoognise and act in ocmformity with jus­
tice and international law and bound to take action 
recording #e Palestine problmn in general and Arab 
private property in particular. The U. N. was 
bound to protect, preserve and restitute -Uxe pro» 
perty and should appoint a custodian to administer it. ' 
The representative continued that the refugro problem is only 
a part of the Wwle Palestine problem. It is the tragedy of 
a naticm temporarily displaced and determined to regain fuH 
ri^ts to its homeland. That nation is ̂ e principal party 
in the issue and no othw has the right to negotiate a peace 
in dlmpegard of that faot.^® 
At #e 17th Sessiiw, Mr. Tannous of the Palestine Arab 
Refugee Office predicted that the patience and determination 
of the Arabs would ultiimtely defeat all of their enemies. The 
invading «pusaders, he pointed out, had tried for over I30 
years to occupy Arab territory far beyond ̂ e limits of Pales­
tine, but finally the Arabs had driven them out. The Zionist 
invasion wuld end the same way, he predicted. 
The feelings of the yofugeem and especially the mibittered 
attitude of the younger generation were shared by the Arabs in 
^^GAOa. 17th Session, Special Politioal Committee, 367th 
Meeting (Deoamber 12, 1^2), p. 220. 
^^GAOB. 17th Session, Special Political Committee, 369th 
Meeting (Dec^ber 13, 1962), p. 236. 
^^Ibid.. p. 235. 
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ganw&l, the Palestinian representative claimed in 1^0« Time, 
he said, would nevw solve #i8 problem. Most of the refugees 
WMpe w»ll indootrinated in their desire to return htwne. This 
indoctrination resulted mainly from sotdu&lization throu#i the 
stAools and throu^i oammmity life, espeoiaUy in the refugee 
osmps. Most of the tea<Aers were refugees themelves; many 
20 
had been @%»loyed as te&câiez« in P^estine. Thus, the United 
Bâtions, in trying to aid the refugees was also keeping alive, 
if not increasing, the temloms in the arwL. 
Sduoation and Employment 
Thou^ the Agency has tried many methods of assisting the 
refugees, its educational facilities have been givem the mmt 
attention and funds. This is because oducation is one of the 
more isg^tant means of j^eparing the refUgew to become self-
Buppœrting, n&erwwr they may ultimately live. As of 1957 
all refugee children received an elemental^ education. Seoon-
daxy education was provided in propœption to that of the host 
countries and teoènioal education was provided as funds were 
available. Univers!^ education was available to a olwsen few* 
However, though the Agency would and did provide the refugees* 
education, it could not, for various reasons, provide mgploy-
ment to follow. Edu(»ti<m has been the end, not the nmans. It 
has given the Palwitinians the means to advance, but there is 
on 
Â. L. Tibawi, "Visions of Betumt The Palestine Arab 
EeAigees in Arabic Art and Poetiy," The Middle g^ast Journal. 
Volume 17 (Autwm, 1963), p. 522. 
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nowhere for thorn to go at present* Consequently, they have 
beoome more and nxxre bitter# Almost all of the youth nho 
beoame dependent on UI3EWA in 194Ô have had some special training, 
21 
but as of 1961, only 3,000 ware selfniupporting* Over cme 
million refugees were still dependent on the Agenoy. Half of 
the latter were over ei^teen years of age. Generally the 
young admits sinoe ̂ ke I96O' s have bemi more literate lâian their 
parents « Thus, tWy are better equipped to hold a job if the 
opportunity arises. However, this same group is less skilled 
in simply making a living. These youth have not had tbe oppor^ 
tunity to leam a trade or teohnioal skill through apprenties-» 
22 
ship. HOT are they oonditiowd to working for a living. 
Following the 1956 War, ̂ e education program was the only 
part of the UMWA rehabilitation program whioh oontinued uninter* 
rupted in many areas. As of 1969, the Director reported Idiat 
eduoatimi had overtaken relief as the largrat Agency budget 
item. It aooounted for 43^ of the expenditures.^^ Thus, with 
the coopération of the refugees, the Agency has been able to 
fashion a solid and acceptable eduoaticmal program. Its suooem 
in finding employment to follow has been very limited* 
As a meazuB of providing some income to the refuses so that 
21 
GAPS. 16th Sessi(m, Annual Report of the Director of tibe 
United Stations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Hear Bast (A/486I), Supplement Bumber I4, p* 1. 
^&bid. 
^%AOH« 24# Session, Eepwt of the Commissioner-Geneiral of 
the United Rations Belief and Works A^ncy for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East (A/76I4), Supplemwit Humber 14» P* 10* 
they isl^t buy foodatuffs to suppléent their rations, the 
Agency itself has long aaployed refugees whenever possible. These 
Palestinian employees have a great loyalty to 1^e task of feeding 
the refugees and administering to their daily needs. On oooasion 
they have oalmed down the more eztrmoe elements of the oamps lAo 
imnt to rejeot even the food provided. However, to the aeoomd 
gwrpose of UMWA, the peaoeful resettlemwt of the refugees, 
these Palestinian einployees are ne^tive. Mather, they like 
their fellow refugem;, advocate taking kwdc their land and 
"pushing the Jem into the sea."^^ Despite this adversity to 
Âgenoy resettlen^t projects, UBBfA has recruited more and more 
of its staff frtm among the camp populations. This has included 
even its technical staff, and as early as September, 1950, «aly 133 
of a staff of 6,071 were recmited inteamationally.^^ 
By 19$8, it finally became possible for the Agency to 
assist the refugees in finding jobs in the Arab States, other 
than those jobs available with the Agency, cm a more ocrgaa^zed 
basis. Pw the first time, the Agency was able to help refugees 
in Syria to find local mnploynmit. Oppwlamities for employment 
also became available in the Gaga Strip as a result of imiKPOvwients 
begun by the lâgyptian authorities and jobs connected with the 
maintmiance of the United Hâtions i^o^gency Force (UK#'). A 
placement service designed to assist refugees skilled in trades 
H. Bagdikian, "Tragedy of Hatred," The Reporter. 
Kovfflober 1, 1956» p. 32. 
^^GAOS. lih Sessitm, Fifth Ccmmittee, 332zul Meeting 
(November 3» 1952)» p. 59* 
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and lETofessions to fiad work in nelggkboring oountries nas 
maintainad. During 19$8 a&m 1,#0 job vaoanoiee were adver­
tised by the Agency, More refugees found permanent employment 
during this year than ever before. However, by 1969» the 
Agency noted that employment prospeots for the graduates of il» 
26 
vocational schools were declining rather tlmn inoreaaing, % 
this time, too, the refugees «ere ccuaing more to feel that 
placement services #we designed as disguised resettlemmit pro­
jects and #mre becoming increasingly wary of seeking jobs, 
Sesettlwmnt 
While Agency educational endeavors have been accepted by 
the refugees, this education has nurtured refugee independence 
and awareness and seesas to have toazimized attitudes among the 
refugee populati<si Wiich are adverse to any permanmit soluticm 
involving resettlmnent. That the refugees have not favored or 
cooperated with Agency resettlement endeavors is substantiated 
by owraaents of the Directors, Mr. John Blandford, the Agency* s 
Director from 1951 to 1953 oozmented that the Agency's functions 
to help improve the living conditions of the refugees, to enable 
than to become self-supporting and to provide hope of social and 
economic recovery vvas a difficult taslf, even when the Agency 
stated specifically that its assistance did not prejudice the 
26 
g ADR. 24th Sessicm, Report of the C ommissionar-Oener al of 
the United Nations Belief and dorks Agencer for Palestine Refugees 
in the Bear East (A/76I4), Supplement Dumber 14, p, 35* 
—35̂  
27 
refugees' ri^t to repatriation or ofmjpwmatlon. 
In his report to the Bi^th Se#8l<m, Mr* Leslie J, Carver, 
the Aoting Jlreotor of the Agency, stated that results were 
disappointing with regard to the Agency's plan of careating jobs 
to help the refugees to beocan© self-supporting. He noted that 
imre time than antioipated had elapsed in deoiding on specifio 
self-support projects. He also commented on ijie virtual unanlW.ty 
with which the Mfugees had told him they would accept nothing 
but a return to their homes as granted then in General Assembly 
Hesolution 194(111).^® 
At a (inference with the representative of the relVigees in 
Jordan in 1955» the spokesmen refHised all resettlement projects 
and insisted on repatriation in line with previous U. N, reso-
lutitms. In Lebanw, in the same year, the refugees resisted 
efforts to improve their shelter because they suspected that 
29 
improved shelters were a disguised resettlenfânt project. During 
the years, trees have been uprooted in camps after they were planted 
by the Agmoy because the refugees resented any action suggesting 
that the oas^ was anything but a transitory stage leading to 
% 
repatriation. 
^^GAOE. 7th Session, Ad Hoc Political Conmiittee, 3rd 
Meeting (Ootober 23» 1952), p. 9* 
28 
8th aessicm, Ad Hoo Political Committee, 23rd 
Meeting (November 2, 1953), p. 113. 
^%AOE. 10th Session, Ad Hoc Political Consnittee, 14th 
Meeting (Hwamber 15, 1955)» P. 54. 
^^Tibawi, OP. cit.. p, 510» 
-40L. 
Time does not sem to have changed this attitude, yet it 
does seem to have reduced the refugees* patimioe in waiting for 
a solution. Tima has also maximized the lack of refugee confi— 
danoe in the United Rations. Cmnps erected close to cities have, 
over the years, become part of the adjoining tovms and generally 
have turned into slums. The oamps in the country, thou^ providing 
few positive opportunities for the refugees, have generally 
turned into villages. The demand for farm hands on a seasonal 
basis has helped improve the lot of this group which generally 
has a more optimistic outlook than the refugees in or near the 
cities* The more urban oai^p inhabitants have had the fewest 
opportunities for «aployiaent. This situation has had a negative 
effect on their standard of living, their feelings and their 
interest in their surrounding.^ 
The situation of the refugees living outside of the oamps 
is not necessarily superior ftom the viewpoint of housing or 
eoonomios, but their social and cultural position seems better. 
The refugees and their children are less bitter. But, they do 
have problems peculiar to their oircumstnao^* (kie of the 
l^rimary ones is that their non-refugee neighbors dislike them and 
often prefer not to maintain any social relationships with 
•^2 
refugee families. 
^Atallah Mansour, "The Arab Refugees and ilChat They fant," 
Hew Outlook. Decanber, 1^7, p. 25. 
^Ibid., p. 26. 
The Agency has also bean v/illing, althou^ disorlmlnating, 
in supporting projects requested by the refugees. Several camps 
have, with Agency support, built their own mosques. In several 
instances, the Agency has simply provided roofing. A vegetable 
market was requested as a project for the largest refugee caiqp 
in Jordan, The refugees, vAan left to their own ideas and 
supported in these ideas by the Agency, have done naich to make 
their camps more permanent living places. Yet, they have re­
lented jauch the same ideas when su^ested by UEfHWA, 
iiespite the fact that one of the obstacles to making the 
refugees self-supporting is the refugees thaimelves, the Agency 
has still found that most of the refugees, as individuals, are 
vdlling to wrk when the opportunity is presented and especially 
if they can keep the U. H. ration cards on which they have come 
to rely. Small ̂ arojects, particularly those not requiring changes 
in the social structure to guarantee some benefits, have been 
most successful.^ 
Success of ffioall resettlmient projects has been most notice­
able in Jordan. Two small agricultural projects were started on 
State lands. Part of the project was to establish a series of 
border settlements and resettle those vho had lost their homes, 
but not their lands. The projects which will eventually resettle 
^^AQR. 13th Session, Annual Report of the Director of the 
United Nations Belief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Hear East (A/3931), Supplement Mumber 14» p. 19* 
^^Don Peretz, "The Arab EeAigee Dilemma," Foreign Affairs. 
Volume 43 (October, 1954)» P» I48* 
5,000 refugee families have been well received» 
As early as 195Î the Director noted "tiiat a shift in Uie 
overall refugee attitude was beconing noticeable. There were 
increasing requests for assistance in individual self-support 
projects and a substantial rise of interest in vocational 
training of all types. There VTBTG even a few requests far more 
and better housing, ̂  The reAtgees to the jExresent, however, have 
continually rejected the types of self—support projects which 
have political implications such as the Yannuk-Jordan Valley 
irrigation projects. 
To date the small scale projects offer little long-term 
hope as a solution to the Palestine and refugee problems. For, 
these projects have absorbed less than the natural in&rease of 
the refugee population. Yet, because there is no stlgom of 
resettl«Bent attached to smaller scale projects, the refugee 
yj 
leaders can afford to lend their support. 
The underlying consideration of XWMk in stressing reset­
tlement grojects has been that participation of the refugees in 
constructive projects would arrest the development of a "profession­
al refuse raentalil^ and the demoralizing effects of the refugee 
camp surroundings. Also, if such projects were successful, the 
cost of relief would be reduced. However, without refugee coopw-
^^Ibid.. p. 146. 
^GAOR, 12th Session, Animal Report of the Director of the 
United Mations Eelief and works Agency for Palestine Eefugees in 
the Hear 2ast (A/3686), Supplement Bumb&r I4, p* 4* 
^^Popetz, OP. cit.. p. 148, 
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resettlen^t projects are doomed. For, the iixab Govern-
n^nts will not act against l^e wishes of the refuse population, 
largely for fe&r of political and military repureussions by 
the refugees, 
Chanises itolng I960* a 
Despite the upheavals and uncertainties of the refuses, 
"Uie Agencgr Director reported in 1969 that a great majoril^ of 
the young people seemed to want to complete their training airà 
acquire skills to help them find employimnt and thereby aid 
thmmelves and their famille».^ The smaller projects becaae 
increasingly successful as the Palestinians seemed willing to 
give up the security of the oB«aps for a definite and tangible 
alternative within their realm of experience# However, nearly 
all still prefer refugee status to a gamble on an experim^t 
beyond their comprehension* The sn»ller projects, too, are 
largely self—sustaining and require little or no inter-govem— 
mental cooperation, which is virtually nw-exlstent. ̂  
This interest in smaller projects, thou^ still with the 
consideration that the projects do not prejudice the refugees* 
right to repatriation or oompensatiwi, does give those isho 
migrate successfully more chance of adjusting to the wnoept of 
resettl«aent# Such migrants may eventually give up their desire 
24th Session, Report of the Commissioner-General of 
the United Nations Relief and .orks Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near iiiast (Â/76I4), Suppl^ient Number I4, p. 7# 
^^Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (..ashington, 
D, C.» The Middle East institute, 193^}» P* zë* 
p- 29. 
to return to However, this does not aeum to bo 
the case as yet. 
jiather thex'j ai-o still maiiy refugoes, both In and out of 
the oaaps, who are militant afxd increasingly aiitagonistic toward 
tha Dtate of Israel. The oam̂ ;8 and villages of the rofugees are 
often descriued as breeding places of unrest in the middle î aat* 
This unrest is soai by teachers in the refugee schools in ̂ arti— 
oular»̂  /aid, the United ̂ atiô z* once it provides the education, 
cannot convince the refugees to participate in large—scale 
resettlement projects, nor can it provide enoû  work on stialler 
scale projects to 3e_,. ûj the camps. 
The "ralestine conscience" or ialostinian nationalist 
feeling which has developed during the years has found a focus 
in the guerilla orgmiiaations whose members are recruited from 
the refuge© population. The guerilla organisations, unlike the 
United Nations, seem to have gained a quiok and universal accep­
tance among the caaip populations.'̂  ̂
In 1969, Laurence Liichelmore, present Commissioner-General 
of UÎGi.VÂ, admitted that the coiaciandos had taken over six Agency 
buildings in several Lebanese camps. He added that finding funds 
for the Agency's work is becoming increasingly difficult, partly 
?̂r0d C. .Jruhns, "Ui ûtudy of iirab iiefUge© /attitudes," The 
lôiddla East Journal, Volume $ (Spring, 1955) t P* 137* 
"̂Inside tha Arab Camps," The Christian Century, l̂ âay 11, 
I960, p. 567. 
Issues Before the 24th General Asŝ bly,** International 
Conciliation, dumber 574 (September, I969), p. 27. 
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b&oausd of the strength and influence of guerillas in the csmpa 
and the oorresponding international unwillin^ess to support the 
o^noando movement for fear of escalating the conflict* Mr* 
Michelmore also stated that it is UBEv/Â's responsibility to 
provide food, shelter and other necessities, but that policing 
the camps and maintaining law and order is the responsibility of 
the refugees and of the Arab Governments. Though some of the 
camps are used as training caters for the oomaandos, the United 
Hâtions disclaims all responsibility for the actions of the 
inhabitants • ̂ 
fhough the refugees have caused problems for UKE#., they 
have also gained a political status in the United Rations. Rather 
than just hearing a Palestinian refugee representative, the 
General Assembly has been hearing spokemnen of one of the comnando 
organisations, the Palestine Liberation Or^utiistation, since I965. 
In 1965 the Arab representatives first asked that this group 
be heard as the official represmitatives of the Palestine people. 
They noted that there mm a distizust difference in the political 
W]^city of the individuals heard by the General Asswtbly since 
1952 (representativwa of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office) and 
the delegations representing the Palestinians directly throu^ 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation.^^ Since then these 
reixresentatives have been invited to speak annually, 
^^he Christian Science Monltw. November 20, 1969, p. 4. 
^%AOB. 20th Session. Special Political Committee, 434th 
Meeting (October I9, 1965), pp. 1-7# 
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These spokesmen, like their predeoessors, hold the opinion 
that the ri^t of the refugees to return hon^ is uncontestable. 
They feel that the Partition Resolution was illegal and undemo-
oratio and maintain that the United Nations is more an aneny of 
the Palestinians than a friend. Suoh plans as the Johnsmi Plan, 
which provided for eoonomio development of the area and oonae-
quent resettleront of the refugees, would only provide for a 
complete fragmentation of the Palestinian people as a political 
and ethnic group. The refugee representatives claim that this 
type of solution to the refugee problem would not lead to a 
termination of the larger Palestine problaa.^ 
Âlthou^ UBIWA has done a needed job in maintaining the 
reft&gee population, it also seems to have perpetuated the 
Palestine conflict. Throu^ its inability to sell the idea of 
resettl^aent, UNEWÂ has allowed the refugees to remain in the 
camps, many of idiioh have recently been turned into oommando 
bases. Though educated, the refugees are unable and unwilling 
to channel their energies into constructive »ots and have 
tended to a more destructive course—to destroy the present 
State of Israel and to replace it with acma type of a new 
Palestine. 
Bad the United Nations concentrated as hard on a political 
solution as on the humanitarian x^oblems, much of the current 
46rt.,rtTi o—^Political Gcmoittee, 442nd 
Summary 
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clleamit mi^t have been avoided* However, looking baok <m 
refugee relationships with the United Bâtions and on refugee 
positions expressed during General Ass^bly debates, one can 
hardly be surprised at the growth of militanoe aimng the refugees 
or at their growing influence in the Middle East. 
The refugees have never liked the United Nations which they 
blame, at least partially, for their displacement. Nor have 
they bean grateful for the subsistence and aid provided by 
UMSIA. Rather, they have c<xne to expect and demand such service 
as their right. In return, they have not cooperated, except 
subtly, with Agency resettlement endeavors. Instead they have 
used the United Nations, the Agency, and especially the education 
services to recreate a Palestinian ocmmnity and Palestinian 
nationalist feeling. This Palestinian c<xmmmity ham now become 
a disruptive influence to the area. 
The regionail governments, throu^ their failure to reach a 
solution, must bear at least part of the responsibility for this 
Palestinian socialisation. % their inaction in finding a settle­
ment, they necessitated the ^arolongaticn of the U. B. aid to the 
refugees. The refugees, once it became appartint that no solu­
tion was readily fortho(«ning, began to shape Agency services to fit 
their own goals. At the same time, they resisted resettlement 
projects as these implied they had given up #ielr hopes of return. 
The concept of return to Palestine has became the main goal of 
the former Palestinians. How many would actually choose to re-
tUrzi, if given a choice, is unknown. However, basing their claims 
••4S-" 
on legal positions resulting from U. K. resolutions, refugees 
have capitalized on an issue which has strong emotional overtones. 
In order to pursue their goal of return, the refugees have 
TOre and imre turned U. H« servi oee from the original intent 
of providing subsistence and facilitating resettlement. Instead 
the refugees have formed militant groups f^om among the camp 
inhabitants and have turned some refugee camps into guerilla 
bases. These c<mnando groups have, particularly sine» the 196? 
War, be%i the leaders in the oampaiga to return to the area 
which «as Palestine. 
The humanitarian services provided by the United Bâtions 
as a temporary measure have become semi—permanent. These 
services to feed, clothe and educate the refugees have given 
the Palestinians the tools to revive a dwmant culture. Al­
though the intent was humanitarian, it has been givai political 
overtones by the Arab Governments, the Israeli Government and 
the Palestinians. Coupled with governmental political deadm 
lock, the Palestinians have been able to ̂ in a significant voice 
in the Middle Bast problem and in M.dclle E&stsrn gcvemzimntal 
polides. 
OH/Lî iïlE 17 
PALSSTINIM OBGAÎÎIZATIOS 
The so-called "refugee mentality" is one common bond 
for the former Palestine comzmnity. One characteristic feeling 
of this refugee mentality ia the ^Palestinians' desire to regain 
their homeland. Since the beginning of the I960* s, at first 
with the aid and encouragement of the Arab States, and present­
ly BK>re spontaneously, this desire has been focused in or^uw 
ized and often militant refugee organiaations. The estimated 
numbers of these groups varies from 27 to 40.^ Of this 
number, however, ottly four have any appreciable influ«noe on 
the area; the i alestine Libopation Organization (PLO), Al 
Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PPLP), 
and Thunderbolt* Estimates of their total guerilla strength 
range fr<w» 3,000 to 15,000,^ 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
One of the first consiando groups to be formed was the PLO. 
It was established by the Arab States Summit Conference in I964 
as the official voice of the Palestine people. The Arab States 
^See "Make Them Q^uakei" Hewaweek. Jamiary 13, 1^9, p. 40, 
and The Christian Science Monitw. June 4» 1969, P» 1. 
See "Make Them Hviakel" p. 40, and "Growing Threat to 
Israel—^ew-^tyle Commandos," U. S. Nero and World Report. 
January 13, 1969, p. 10. 
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gar© it financial support and q^iiasi-diplomatio status. Itc 
main governmental patron was suad still is the United /txab 
lieiiublic. Its constituency among the Palestinians was 
At first, the rjjj was re^xded quite cynically by the middle— 
claas Palestinians, althou^ it is now more generally accepted» 
In September, I964, the Axab League approved the PLO's plan to 
This zmzgr ims <»noeived as an integral part of the Egyptian 
led Unified àxab Military C(%ma&d mid was to be a vanguard in 
the Arabs* battle against Israel, fhe Palestine Liberation Arigy 
was voted $15 million by the Arab States. Training facilities 
were offered by Egypt in the Gaaa Strip and Sinai Peninsula» 
uyria and Iraq also offered training aresus to the Palestinians * 
In Mar<^, I965, the organization announced conscription of all 
residents in the Gaza Strip nom oetween 1937 and 1944 and 
sobeduled summer training for stxne 6,000 refugee students*^ 
The PLO at the time of its establishment was more than just 
a means to placate the refltgees and contain anti-Israeli feeling 
^Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Eesistance Movemeuti 
Its Significance in the Middle iSast Crisis," The Middle East 
Journal. Volume 23 (Sumner, I969), P» 297» 
recruit a Palestine Liberation AxExy from among the refugees 
tcbid.. p. 294. 
^efu^roes in the Middle Bast; A Soluticm in Peace. 
Israeli Information Services CBcwr York, 19&7)* P« 24. 
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axxtxig them. It ima also designed to implement the Arab jlaxt 
to prevmit Israeli use of the Jordan waters for lrri@ati<m« 
Siaœ 1^4 ̂e PLO has been officially recognized by the Arab 
League and most Arab GovenaMBts as the spokiMuaan for all of the 
Palestinians. ̂ AM since 1964, the president of the PLO ham 
been accorded a plat** as Chief of State representing the Pales­
tine entity at meetings of the Arab League.^ Ahmad Shul^ii^, con­
sidered one of the best mob orators in the Middle Bast, first 
headed the organization. The presmt leader is Tasir A]%fat« 
Though the Arab States have granted staWs to Uie PLO, 
o^er, parti<mlarly Israel and A1 Fatah, have considered it 
meorely a facade. Its freedom of action is somewhat limited by 
9 
depeiuienoe on the Arab Governments for mtmey and supplies*'^ 
EowevKP, the PLO does have ambitious, if somewhat contradio— 
tOTy goals. Although its title indiwtes its main goal is to 
liberate Palestine, Shukairy cmce stated his or^U!iizatl(m* s 
policies toward Jordan by saying "before the liberaticai of 
Palestine, Jordan will have to be transfcmaed into a military 
base after being liberated." He also ctmwnted that "the first 
target is Jordan, not Israel."^® 
^"Issues Before the 20-tii General Assambly," International 
Conciliatl<w. Mo, 554 (September, I965)» P» 43. ' 
Fred J. %ouri, Thft ArmWTnrftal 1 (Syracuse, N.Y., 
Syracuse (Tniversi^ ftess, 1963), p. 112. 
^J. H. Huizinga, "The Palestine Refugees* Perennial Source 
of Trouble," The apporter. May 18, 1)67, p, 34* 
^"Arafat in Command," The Economist. February 8, I969, p. 25. 
Viewpoints," New Outlook. January, I967, p. 3. 
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Rôferriûg to a future Palestinian State, one g.^oketman 
said, "lie do not intond to drive thera (the Israelis) out as 
they drove us out. v/e think that there is room in Palestine for 
six million Palestinian .Irabs and Jews. The only condition is 
himself, before I967, hoped that a result of guerilla war would 
not necessarily be the direct liberation of Palestine, but that 
it would provoke Israeli officials into a large—scale counter­
attack and, as a result, the Government would incur international 
condemnation as an aggressor. He also hoped to provoke the 
Israeli military into attacking Jordan, annexing the ;/est Bank 
and thus acquiring more rebellious Arabs than the country could 
12 
contain. The Israeli military did occupy the ./est Bank in 
1967, but Shukairy's hoped for results have not been realized. 
The Palestine Liberation Army, before I967, was reputed to 
be of the hi^est quality. In theory, this Army was on offer 
to any of the States bordering Israel. In practice, the offer 
lay fallow because of the mistrust betwe«i the Arab nations.^^ 
The Army was decimated in the June, 1^5?, #@r. By I969 it 
had been partially reorganized and units imre stationed in 
that they accept to live as peaceful citizens." 
^^Wdson, OB. oit», p. 304. 
Carthew, "For the Arabs, Israel Does Rot Exist," 
The Kw York Times Magazine. i-Kcjjriber 18, 1969» p. 31* 
^Make Them Q.uaket*' p. 40. 
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Throughout its history the ?L0 has been more oloselj/ tiad 
to liiddl© iJastorn govermaents than any of the other oommando 
groups. Following the 196^ /ar, the organization has been 
under constant pressure from President lasser to merge with 
the Egyptian oontrolled paper organisation "Heroes for the 
Liberation of Sinai. 
Thuadegbolt and the PomJLar Front 
T&amderbolt, kziom as "Saiqa" in Arabic, ia one of the 
maaller, but more militant of the (X»amaado groups. It wm 
formed in Kov«mb«r, 1^71 &s the consolidation of several Syrian 
terrorist groups. It is entirely Syrian controllM and equipped, 
but beoause of relaxed Syrian policies toward the guerillas, does 
have a great deal of latitude in its actions. It is widely dis­
liked by many Arabs and Palestinians became of its extreme anti— 
Hasser orientation and its dose ties with the most fanatic 
elements of the Syrian Baa-fâi Party.It is most active on 
the Syriaa-Jordan border and alcmg the Jordan fiivor.^^ Its 
18 
strength is estimated at 1,500 men, 
The Popular Promt for the Liberatim of Palestine was the 
product of a 1967 merger of several enaller Arab based terrorist 
groups and is headquartered in Beirut* Demanded by a former 
Syrian army captain, Ahmad Jibril, the PRLP has training camps 
^%bld. 
^^Ibid. 
^^ffiidson, OP. cit.. p. 297, 
^^"Growing Threat to Israel—Hew-Style CœaaandoB," U, S. 
Bewg and World Beport. January 13, I969, p, 10, 
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Bcsttered throughout Lebanon in refugee villages. The dive aion 
of an 131 A1 jet to Algeria in July, 1963, and the attack on 
an El A1 ̂ 0^ at Athena airport in January, 19^9» are its most 
19 
inqpreaaive claims to date. ̂  The main methods of the Popular 
Front have been to organize inaide occupied areas and carry out 
spectacular acta of terroiism against Israeli citizens, The 
Front's leadership claims a ooomitment to inculcating a revo­
lutionary, egalitarian spirit among the Palestinians as well as 
the indigenous Arab population. In addition to attempts to 
organise inside occupied territory, it seeks to establish "liber-
20 
ation" beachheads in the more conservative Arab States# 
The Popular Front, like the FLO consideis the State of 
21 Jœcdaa as much of an eneiqy as it does Israel* It also con­
siders the PLO too much of an offspring of the Arab League to 
be able to represent the Palestinians. Rather, the PFLP would 
like to see an organization oonprising all of the commando groups 
in a broad federation with all of the active groups on equal 
footing. Such an organisation, Popular Front leadership feels, 
would provide for a more auccessful stinig^e against Israel» 
However, the BYont is itself split three ways* the non-political 
fitting group, one moderate political wing and one îJarxist 
22 
wing. Yet, its guerilla force is one of the largest, totalling 
^^"kake Them i^uakel" p. 40. 
^^udsoa, op. dt.. p. 299. 
^^Ibid.. p. 300, 
Arafat in C<Mnmand," p. 25» 
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2"^ 
approxiisataly 2,000 men. 
AI Fatah 
AX Fatah is the largest and oldest of the major resistance 
organisatioas; it is also the most active group today. It was 
founded in 1956 as a se wet sooie^, but did not begin active 
operations agaimit Israel until 196$# Fatah is ocmaitted to the 
libm^ation of all of Palestine frc® Zionist political control 
and its leaders believe the only zmans is axti^ violence. 'Co 
Fatah "libei%ti(m" means not only the destruction of the inQseoD-
ialist base of Israel, but also the eradication of Zionist 
socieV hy spiking at its Industrial, agricultural and financial 
institutions.^^ One of its primary mmns to achieve its ̂ >al 
is to keep alive an etm>tional attachment of the younger refugees 
to Palestine as a natimml "honfâland."^^ 
i'atah was originally sponsored b;/ the Syrian uovernment, 
Syrian officials have made it plain that they hoped to provoke 
war by enwuraging sabotage by the comnandos. Though the main 
Fatah bmaes have been in Syria, the organization has precipitated 
tensions in the Arab wrld by crossing to Jordan and Lebanm to 
stage its raids on Israel rather than trying to cross the more 
26 
hi^ily fortified Israeli-Syrian border. 
A1 Fatah, at least initially, represented The marginal 
Growing Threat to Israel," p. 10. 
^•^udson, OP. pit., p. 299» 
^^Fred J. Khouri, "The Policy of Retaliation in Arab—Israeli 
Relations," The Middle Bast Journal. Volume 20 (Autumn, I966), 
p. 440. 
—56— 
Falestinlaas—the imemployed, young, both educated and uneducated, 
who were prey to deliberately inculcated hatred and had a desire 
for botii glory and money.After the 1967 War, Fatah*a 
popularity spread to more diverse groups. Saudi Arabian King 
Feisal*8 wife gave 14»500 to the organization. Arab you-Ui now 
28 
peddle Fatah stamps like Christmas seals. From the refugee 
camps and the universities, which are often staffed with zealous 
Palestinian professors, come more recruits than Fatah needs. The 
organisation accepts mostly Palestinians, and then only those who 
29 
can pass rigorous medical and ̂ ychiatric tests. Today 
Fatah has a fitting strength of about 5»000.^ 
Like the other fedayeen gzxxups, Fatah is most secretive 
about its leadership. It is said to be ruled by a committee of 
wealthy civilians in Damascus. As Fatah grew and begmi to feel 
a need for a visible spokesman, Yasir Arafat became the ambass­
ador extraordinaire to the Arab world, chief fund raiser for the 
organization and field cœmander in Jordan.^ 
Following the 196? War, Fatah became better armed than 
before, and at the expense of the Arab hosts. After the Uar, 
Fatah teams took camels into the Sinai desert to oolleot the 
machine guns, rifles, bazookas and grenades left by the retreating 
Shlomo, "The Heal Eesistanco," Hew Outlook. January, 
1968, p. 46, 
pA 
"The Guerilla Threat in the Middle East," Time, December 
13, 1968, p. 31. 
^^Ibid.. p. 32. 
Growing Threat to Israel," p, 10, 
3I|itjiq Guerilla Threat," p. 31* 
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22 Arab armies before the Israeli salvage squads could gather .hem, 
Fatah leaders do not fear renewed aggression by Israel 
against Egypt or any other Arab State; rather they feel that they 
oould profit. Mostly they are concerned that there rni^t be a 
diplomatic settlement.Fatah officials do not expect to de­
feat Israel directly or alone. Rather they plan to wage a 
prolonged campai^ of violence against vital institutions of 
the Israeli State, being careful to avoid any situation ./here 
the Israeli military ca^t profit from its superior organization 
14. and technology. Yet, even the June War helped Fatah» It 
cz^ated a climate in tiAiich the Palestine question again became 
35 
the principle issue in the Arah world. 
Once Palestine is liberated, opinions differ among i'atah 
members as to the type of state vAiich will follow. One Fatah 
spokesman declared that only the Jews who were in Palestine be­
fore 1948, and their offspring, would be allowed to renain.^ 
Othors claim that no one will be driven out who is ready to 
live under a ialestinian denwwacy. 
Today the general trend within the, coimando movement is 
consolidation under the leadership of Fatah. The formation of 
^Xbid. 
^^Sudson, OP. oit., p. 300, 
^id.. p. 304. 
^Ibid.. p. 299. 
^Ibid.. p. 304. 
^^iilias J. Khoury, ••Palestine and the National Liberation 
Movements of the Third world," Student ./orld. Second Quarter, 
1969, P. 130. 
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th© Palestinian -itriigglo Comaand, a fédération of the 
ooiasiando organisations, in ̂ .^11, 1969» 't%8 intended to im-^vovs 
tho military coo^wation among the guérillas, Hov/aver, cooper­
ation has not improved greatly and auoh infighting and distrust 
still exists. As one member of the more politically active 
Popular J'ront said of Fatah, "Fatah is a blank sheet, ^Inyone 
may vjrite on it vAat he wants," Fatah has virtually taken over 
the eleven man executive oonanittee of the Gonaaand, It has four 
members and holds the chairmanahip. The Comaittee tries to 
neutralize the hostility of the dissident groups. The presence 
on the executive ooninittee of members of the Syrian supported 
Saiq,a group does not help to dispell hostilities. Other com­
mando groups suspect this group of kee^in: tabs on thau for 
38 
the Syrian Government# The infighting among the cosaaando 
groups also contradicts the curi-ent guerilla philosophy of 
39 "one enemy at a time is enough," 
General Guerilla Support 
As a whole the guerilla movement is negative in t(me. 
Mainly it ja^oiiwtes the destruction of the State of Israel, Yet, 
the guerilla or^niaations, in recent nwnths, no longer have 
to recruit members, but are receiving volunteers. Their rank» 
are no longer solely Palestinians. Memhars now include foreign 
^"iirafat in C<Mflmand," p, 25, 
^^"The Guerilla Threat," p. 32. 
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nationals and oven soma lower class Jews. îlost of this latter 
group are Bas tern Jews who are the subjects of disoricîination 
in Israel by their /estemJewish oounterx^arts. These anti— 
Sioniste sympathizo strongly with tho commando cause, but for 
reasons different from those of the .lr&b$.^^ 
The fedayeen, translated men of saOTifice, ara also fighting 
a^iainst the .Irab Governments. I'hey owe no allegience to any 
government and are responsible only to themselves. They view 
any settlement other than their own as a betrayal or a disaster»^ 
So far they have prevented the /irab Governments from negotiating 
with the Israeli Government. 
Before 1956, most of the border violations were carried 
out by unofficial, unorganized and rela-^r'-r ly non—violent 
infiltrations of individuals and small groups. Often these 
raids were a response to a specific v/rong such as loss of an 
/Irab raider's land or the death of a family member at the hands 
of the Israelis. Thus, the commando raid is not a new phenomena. 
However, oommando organization is. Yet, the consnandos still do 
not follow a typical guerilla Tsarfare pattern. Most targets are 
not the military installations or public utilities. Rather they 
are airplanes, buses and other nasans of conveyance, religious 
shrines and geneMil large urban areas. The targets seem to be 
chosen to meet two criteria» to kill the maadLmum number of 
^The Christian Science Monitor, Ifarch 5» 1970, p, 1, 
^'•The Guerilla Threat," p. 30, 
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people £md to provoke anti-Israeli sentiment, both 
locally E'-nd internationally. 
The sense of Palestinian political coiaminity virhioh has 
reemerged after two decades draws :zuoh of its cohesion fïrom 
the common refugee experience of loss of land and of homeland* 
This may be one reason vshj- today the conmando movemonts have 
been able to develop a base %7i.th participation of all classes 
of Palestinians, This broad base is in contrast to tho limited 
resistance movements, both political and military, which have 
ariseai since 1917* 
Despite their differing opinions on the long-range objec­
tives and the means to these goals, the ccmmndo groups aro 
agreed in their rejection of the November "2, 196?, Security Coun­
cil Resolution.^ In this rejection, they are supported by the 
refugee population in general, which still calls for a set­
tlement on tlie basis of the 1946 General Assembly Resolution, 
whereas the refugees in 1955 were reported to be vzilling to 
accept a separate state or to accept Arab-Jewish coexistence 
in Israel, no Palestinian organization today has adopted these 
goals, Bather, the Palestinians and the populations of the 
Jirab States seam more bent cm driving out the Israelis or at 
least subordinating the Jewish population to Arab rule* 
Thou^ anti-Israeli feeling is still strong among the 
Palestinians there are some recent signs of demoreillzatlon and 
^"Issues Before the 24th General Assembly," International 
Conciliation* Humber 574 (^eptembur, 1969), P* 16* 
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general we&îarioBB aoonj tho terrorist organisations, Jtonoy .'3 
sorao impetus to the guei'illao, but it doos not sees to be 
ennUf^ to draw tlio older refugees, I'ost of the recoatly cap­
tured coKiDandos have baen young, new recruits* The veterans and 
officers seem to have grorm wary of the deeper raids into 
Israol,^^ 
Though the ideal of recovering ales tine is stronger tharx 
ever, several reasons can be offered for this denoralization and 
restraints 
1. the lack of idsological underpinnings on what to do 
once l'aies tine is liberated and 
2. th^ disagreement among and within the groups on .joala 
and tactics presently» 
fha? the rival groups and factions also occasionally elaim 
credit for the more spectacular forays indicates compétition 
rather than cooperation.^ Nor do the groups appear able to 
resolve their differencea satisfactorily with even the possibil­
ity of an Arab—Israeli diplomatic settlement looming before then. 
Jordan, the guerillas receive 10-15 dinars p&c n»nth 
plus their keep. The Arab Legion soldiers get only three dinars, 
(see Amn(Mi ihibenstein, ** 'Damn Everybody* Sums Up the Angry Mood 
of Israel," The Hew York Times Magazine, li^bruary 9» 1969, 
P. 96.) 
^fhe bombing of the i^lahanek Yehuda marketplaoe in Jerusalem 
was olaimed by two rivul gx'oups. The bombing killed 12 civilians 
and wounded 53* xhe fedayeen council finally awsxded the honor 
to A1 Fatah as it told the moat convincing Biary of the bombing, 
Fatah also took credit for blasting the jpr&ge of formmr Israeli 
Chief of Gtaff Itzhak Rabin. Later, it «as leaamed that he had 
no garage. (See "The Guerilla Threat in the Middle ^st,*" p. i>3,) 
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Summary 
Pour main #i@rllla groups have taken on an istportant 
positicm in the Palestinian cause during the 1960*8. The goal 
of regaining the homeland of Palestine is oornown to all of thorn# 
However, the means to aohieve this goal as veil as the structure 
of a future Palestinian state differ among the groups* This 
disagreanent ammg the Palestinians further ocHsplioates the 
disagreement among the Arab Grovems^nts and between the Arabs 
and the Israelis, and definitely has decreased the dimnoes of a 
diplomatic settlement* 
The present Palestinian militance has been developing for 
some time, althou^ the present organization is nev compared 
to the sporadic, unplanned forays a^inst arael in previous 
years. Adequate notice of Palestinian demands has also been 
given. Many of the current Palestinian d^nands had earlier been 
voiced in United Rations debates. The faotw whioh would have 
been the most difficult to foresee is the commandât^' attacks, 
both verbal and military, on the Arab host nations. Political 
disagreements have existed between the Palestinians and the 
Arab States, but the refugees sudden and unabetting disruption 
in the host countries is more recent. The Arab Governments, 
as well a.D Israel, have now become the alesti^ians' enemies. 
cmprm v 
rÂL^STOIiLKS iiiîD ISEAiL 
In general the Palestinians look upon the Jovm and "Hie 
State of Israel as intruders in the Middle i^t. The lailitanoe 
of the oomaando groups, however, is more typical of the Pales­
tinians living outside of Israel's borders. The Arabs living in 
Israel and in the areas occupied by Israel during the 196? 
«/ar, thou h they sympathize with commando goals, display an 
entirely different relationship with Israel. This relationship 
is presently one of cot^zistenoe, despite the discrimination to 
which they are subjected. Thou^ the Israeli Arabs resent their 
secondmolass citit nship status, they se@a more willing to accept 
the Jewish regirm than any other groups of Palestinians. A study 
of their current role and their potential role in the conflict 
serve to show even more how complex the situation is and how mucdi 
influence the Palestinians have in the chain of Middle ̂ iastem events, 
Xriox* to 1967 
The luru-wli Govei'ntient realized soon after the 194<^ w&r 
that the xalestiiiiuns v-ould not be turning en masse. It quickly 
took £Jteps to v.nd .Lrab pi-opert^ omiership in order to set a 
fiz-uu. base Tor the new country. In 1953 the Israeli parliament, 
or iCnessut, x^assed the Land i-ciiuisiiiun Lew which stated that 
"64" 
any persœi «âxo had fled his village and was absent «&en Israeli 
forœs had entered the area autonatioally lost his land to the 
Custodian of Absentee x^operty» iUiother Law, the Law of Eetrnm, 
also disoriminated against the jr'alestinians* It stated that any 
Jew ocMBing to Israel could olaici immediata citizenship by deolw-
iïghis intentions to settle; noiWews had to enduro a waiting 
period#^ That these Israeli legal prooeduros wore detrimental 
to the iiTabs who had lived in Israel or vriLshod to return, and 
that they vr&ro oontrary to provisions of the United Nations 
Partition Eesoluti<»i, whicdi stated that the Arabs in laraol should 
2 not be s'ubjects of discrimination, has increased Palestinian and 
Arab Government arguments against recognition of the a ta te of 
Israel. However, Israeli officials have consistently maintained 
that such actions are within the limits of a sovereign state 
and that, as a mc bar of the United Nations, Israel is definitely 
granted all of the ri^ts and privileges of a sovereign state* 
This position has not made Israeli relationships witii the Pales­
tinian iirabs, either inside or outside her borders, any easier* 
The Israeli officials have maintained since 1^4^ that direct 
relief by the U« H. was only a temporal^ measure. The works 
projects, which have never tmterialiaed to any extent, have been 
considered nwre important became they had Iwger^range implications. ̂ 
^GAQR. 22nd oession, L'ote by the uyrian delegate to the 
Secretary-General (a/7173)» Agenda It«n 94» August 10, 1968. 
'"General Assmably Resolution I6l(ll}, November 29, 1947» 
-'Gfi.vlt. 5th oesaion, .là Koo i-'oliticsi Committee, jpth Iloeting 
(Sovember 7» 1950), p. 214. 
"-65"» 
Th@gr were also better suited to aohieviag Israeli ez^« How-
ever, they have never provided a satisfaotory soluti<m beoaaise 
of opposition by tiie Arab States and by the refugees. As 
refugees living in Iwael do have oitizenship, relief and wxeks 
projects in Israel have, for the most part, bema qarried on as 
an inteomal matter without USEBIA assistance. % I95I, Israel's 
Govœn&aent reported #at most of the tweadsinners, among tW 
24, OCX) Arab refugees in Israel, imre gainfully employed. This 
mmber, however, exoluded the white collar workers.^ fhe Goven*» 
m«at felt that thtxae not yet employed ocmld easily be absorbed 
by mrious works projects if they so desired. 
Through 1952, the Agen<^ was providing for two types of 
refugees in Israel. It iwovided for 17,000 Jews who had fled 
the iirab States, all but 3,000 of vdicHn had bew resettlM. It 
was also providing fm? 31,000 Arabs, 7,000 of vAwm had been 
resettled.^ Tims, Israel was not so q^iok to welctme Arabs as 
to weloome Jews, although the Govemmmit did take over the 
maintenance of these refugees by the middle 1950's. 
In addition to appropriating the lands of the Palestinians 
who fled and not granting immediate citizenship to Arabs as to 
Jem, the Israeli Govemmemt also au^iorized the acquisition of 
land fnm Arabs living in Israel if it were needed for the «xgpansicm 
5th Sessiw, Assistance to Palestine Refugees, Interim 
Bepwt of the Director of the United Nations Belief and Works 
Ageaicy tm Palmatixw Refugees in the Hear Bast (A/l4$l^ev. 1), 
Suppléent Bumbw 19, p. 9# 
P' 5-
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of a kibbutz or of private Jewish farm holdings. Much of this 
property, as well as the property apia?ofa*iated from -Wie absmit 
Palestinians, was in -Une bwder regions, a faot whioh made it 
strategically significant. The Land Acquisition Law did provide 
that compensation be paid for property acquired from Arab resi­
dents of larael, but made no provisions for those Arabs living 
outside of Israel. It also stipulated that the land taken from 
Arab residents be necessary for "vital development, settlmient w 
securitgr" during the period from May 4, 1949» to April 1, 1952. 
Compesusaticm was to be paid in oash or an alternative pie<^ of 
land was to be found if the owner bad be%i engaged in agriculture. 
This Law was opposed at the time by the ilrab minority in the 
Knesset» Yet it was at least a partial effort to appease those 
who increasingly favored payment to all Palestinians for their 
lost îxroperty»^ 
The United Hâtions estimated that the total abandoned 
properly passed to Israel was 16,324 square kilometers* This 
7 
was valued at 100 million Israeli pounds. In addition, the 
Israelis acquired some 20 millimi Israeli pounds wwth of move­
able property left behind by the refugees.® 
In addition to appropriating Arab property, Israeli officials 
^Dom Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (Washington, 
D. C., The Middle issuat Institute, 19^8), p. 183. 
^GA(B. 6th Session, Progress leport of the United Hâtions 
G<moiliation Camission for Palestine (a/1985)> supplement Number 
18, p. 11. 
^Ibid., p. 6. 
have segregated, the Arab popilation into specific areas of the 
country for "secwrity" reasons, They have alec restricted Arab 
cAvements within Israel. Until the 196? June V,ar, the Israeli 
Govemmant maintained ourfewB throughout all of the Arab areas* 
isuch internal policies have done little to win -tixe allegiance of 
the Arab population to the Israeli authorities* Thus, more and 
nN)re iu^abs have left Israel all the time, 
Eowever, 8<m8 of the mre moderate Israelis disputed these 
means, most of Wiioh resulted from policies of former Prime 
Minist^ Ben Gurioa. The more moderate elements felt, rather, 
that such militant policies would only cause moT@ alienation, 
instead of making the Arab residents into Ic^al oitizmis, Their 
Q 
opinions have been borne out by current situations. The Israeli 
militance, as will be shown, seems to Mve lessened, raldiar than 
increased, the «illingaes» of the Palestinians to seek a perma-
nmit settlement with Israel. 
Violence and harsh military policies have also bemi char­
acteristic of Israeli policy totmrd the Palestinians. According 
to a report by the United Hâtions Truce Supervisory Organisation 
(UHTSO) Chief of Staff, an Israeli attack in the Gaga Strip <m 
August 22, 1955» began the chain of violent which started the 
10 
subsequent organized fedayeen attacks on Isisel. This military 
^Pred J. Khouri, "The Poli<%r of Retaliation in A3«b—Israeli 
Relatioma," The Middle fiast Journal. Volum 20 (Autmm, 1)66), 
P» 437. 
^°Ibid.. p. 440. 
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retaliation has greatly escalated tensions in Israel aM in the 
refugee oaoqps surrounding Imrael. Israeli officials olaim that 
during the period of Egyptian belli^irwioy prior to the I956 
Suez War, there «ere some 435 oases of armed fedayeen incursions 
against Israel, nwrly 2,(XX) cases of armed robbery and 172 
oases of sabotage perpetrated hy Idle Egyptian military wd feda— 
yewi groups.^ Israel's military iras the first of the Middle 
Eastezm states to develop a deliberate and of^cial policy of 
12 
retaliation to sucâx commando attach • 
The Karf Qasim incident in 1956 is one eacaoBple of the direct 
Israeli use of terror against its Arab po^ilati<m. The incident, 
according to the Arab States, is typical of Israeli policy* Accord­
ing to Israeli odMMcials, it is not. The Tillage of Eaf^ Qasim 
lay about one-half mile Arom the Jcurdan border, inside of 
Israel. Maay of the 1,500 villagers had gone to work the fields 
in the axwning. Whèn they returned h%ae, they were rounded up 
and told th^ had violated a ourfew imposed that morning vâiile 
they had been working. Far a crime of %tl(A they imre ignorant, 
they wwe shot. The Isx^eli Prime Ministw withheld ̂ e news 
for scHse time until he had reported the incident to the îûoesset. 
The Israeli Government announced that it was an acoidaat and 
that compensation would be allotted to the surviving relatives. 
The number slain has never been detei^mined exactly, but estimates 
^^GAOB. 1st EMergenoy Special Sessicm, Plenary 
Meotl;:^ ^November 1, 1956), p. 23. 
"'^Khouri, CD. cit.. p. 436. 
Suoh inoidoitSy «he^er mla— 
takes OT preplaimed, have not helped the Palestinians, OT -Uie 
Arab oommunity, to view Israel as a peaoe-loviaag state. 
Despite raider harsh Israeli retaliaticm policies, the 
Government has not applied c^tinuous military pressurw in the 
occupied areas. Onoe the Israeli military occupied the Gaza 
Strip, Jordan and the other Ai#b States Imagined that the 
indigenous Arabs and the refugees would be thrown out so that 
Israel would have more space to acoosaoodate Zionist immigrants,^^ 
However, the U. M. Seoretary-General, in a note to the Genw^ 
Assembly in 1956, stated that, except for some groups of local 
inhabitants taken out for q.uestioning, there was no evidence of 
mass deportation of the Strip's inhabitants. He also noted that 
migration between the Strip and Jordan was continuing as in the 
past, despite proclamations forbidding this nmvement.^^ Thou^ 
the Arab States were concerned about Israeli e%pansi<m, this 
eaqpansion se«Bed to be in line with the wifdies of certain of the 
Palestinian oommxa&o groups iriio wanted to force Israel into 
large-scale retaliation and the subsequent talœover of more 
territory, just so that the territory was filled with Arabs* 
Thus, the Palestinians would, they hoped, have an inside base 
^^AQR. 11th Session, 630th Plenary Meeting (Deo^aber 1 
, p. 785. 
^^AOS. let Emeaegmc^ Special Sessiw, 562nd Plenary 
,ng (Hovember 1, 1956), p. 14« 
^^GAOE. 11th Session, Annexes, Agenda Itœa 66 (A/3491)» 
December 3, 1956, p. 37. 
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for their op^aticms. However, Israeli eoonoznio advanta^s to 
the Palestinians in Israel have left this group not so prone to 
resist as had been hoped. The Israeli military has also been 
harsh <m any Arabs suspected of aiding the oommandos. Arabs' 
houses have been destroyed and persons arrested simply <m suspioioa 
of their having participated in guerilla warfare against Israel# 
Ohanaes After the 1%7 War 
Aft«r •Uie ISfSj War, the situation was drastiosCLly altered. 
Israel had gained uncontested oontrol in the West Bank, the 
Gaza Strip and the Sinai Pemlmmla and had beoo^ the largest 
host country in the Middle East. Instead of being able to 
criticize the Arab States fm? their inaction, Israel's Government 
«as in tiie position of being the occupation power and of having 
to deal with the refugees Wiether they remained in otxRipied 
territory or moved into Incael proper. The Israeli Government 
was ̂ so faced with the question of ;Aat to do with #e new 
territorial acquisitions—annex them to Israel or leave than 
opwi f(W bargaining. This question has yet to be resolv# and 
is ottô of the worst points of dlsagremwnt betwe«m ^le Arab 
Governments and Israel today. The Israeli Government's relations 
with the Palestinians, both the Arab oitizew and the new refugees 
of the 1967 conflict, changed drastically following the I967 
War. As yet, mudk of this relationship is hinging on the ev«n-
tual disposition of the occupied territcwies. 
Bather than make a decision as to how to solve the problem 
-Tî^ 
#e refugee#, the Israeli Corexxmeitt ha» Wwa aotioa only 
iSien aeoweary. Little in the way of lomg-teanm projects whldk 
oould provide a final solution have been initiated. However, 
Isx^eli officials have raaained very aware of the feeling of 
the Palestinians and have taken minimal steps to oalm doim this 
population whenever feelings begin to ra^. 
The main fear of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel following 
the 1967 War was that they would be out off from the remainder of 
the Arab wcxrld* Israeli of^oials allag^ this fear by allowing 
tpa&a ami traffio with Jordan Arom both tM Gasa Strip aiui the 
West Mxùc» Israeli officials intended not to treat the Pales­
tinians of the occupied twritories as a people apart, a mis­
take lAitdi they felt had been mad^ by the irab States.Before 
#e 1967 War, XJHSWA bad oared for approzimately 400,000 refugees 
m i^e West Bank and 320,000 the Bast &mk. By July 2, 1967, 
approximately 100,000 had fled from the West Bank to the Bast 
Bank and to the Gasa Strip, many into existing UHBWÂ c*mps in 
17 
these areas. Thou^ others left aftw this date, the total 
numbws who fled by no n^ans reached the mimbers of those who 
had fled in 1948# This would seem to signify that though the 
Palestinians still carried a violent distaste for the Zionist 
philosophies embodied in the State of Israel, they were no 
^^"Israel and the vooupied Lands," New Statesman, April 
15, 1968, p. 442. 
^^The aoonomist. July 8, I967, p. IO3. 
t:o c-dvors-. to llvxn, Is::\.u]i ri-lc tli:.son could 
not r; txon.i-j ir. to th. .E,1V.., .,I\y tl j^lioi^ld Cv-.j ir-st„r.a of 
u_)root..;d L 
l2i'..^li to.M..x-u tiio:.!, ..i-o lo.l't o^ou^i^d. ^oiy as 
wull C.U tav»ai'd vd 3 r ju. th t % i^olution to both 
^.ro.)l.....iï., ..a,.- uuoaidxux'v to th-- ovj":.!! uiSi-ut,. Isr^^l 
r,nd th- .i-ab ...tatojj, unluoa und i-ntil tl:^ j CoVw^*n; u-nts 
to »ii%.ut noQutiations :^d dij...lo": latio recognition of 
loX'iiv-;!, no oonov^clan on ibcuus such co rctu.'n or 
lo ovt-cua -ion of tli- ocouwiud aroas '.vould ce ..:'ad=_, 
J;/ 30i l_,,OuC ..i'uus had ruiiiiitcd •..'itli thvir 
j?wrdli>.3 irt Israul, iIoi;ovur, only aoout .,,000 v/oro ^/Jiuiitud by 
dir„ot auvlioation. . .ost or tiio roci(.i.i c ^uru ir.rilti-ators 
-..'Iio a^^li^d arto.r rotiirninj i/O Israel illj^allj and 'Joro jt?i'.ntaà 
.  .  ,  . 1 9  •uiw- I'iiJit ^ ) x-v^inaxii, 
tiia 19^7 ar, Liio i.araôli ocoujatiou d'orooa turned 
thvir ii-iaoaiat-; attention to national u^cuxit^' i . th« nonl^ 
ooou^iod ai'oau* ^-lio i'aot tWt uost oi thouo -a.'abs r.,r,iaiziin,T 
WOP'5 only x'xiiuaaoiits of faailios oauaod tho military to oon^idor 
thuîa a potontial fifth ooluirai, iïi the intwroata of socux'ity aad 
ai-iay rule, equality ïms given a baokseat in thu Israeli ..rab 
community. ->acurity regulations on ..raos in Israel proper, 
I.j . jvt;., were roia%od after th 146? ,ar# All travel rostrictions 
IB 
- oivt-i, "Jlx-j I.ov; ...Tau fhu ro ̂ ossiva, 
>eceM or, 1967, P* 31* 
erjtii, laraol and the ralogtin^ .urabs, g. 
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mœe lifted. îhœre vwe no longer any nlgbt curfews except in 
^e Gaaa Strip. Yet, despite leniency by the Israelis, growing 
terrorist activities stagad from the Arab States have ignited 
nationalist feelings mang the younger Arabs undw Israeli rule. 
Occasionally protmzrorist slogans are found on houses. The 
Az^b population beccmnes nervous whenever a bomb explodes and 
20 usually avoids Jewish population centers for several days. 
Since the 1^67 War, a few Palestinian leaders, both in 
Israel and in the Arab States, have dared to sug^st that the 
Palestinian people should make peace independently with Israel 
to obtain territory for a new Palestinian nation. Moat, how­
ever, still se«B to want revenge for their losses of proper-^ 
and years of exile more than Idiey want peace. Row successf^il 
any peace settlement would be today is questionable as Israeli 
officials still refuse to recognize the refugee population as 
a political entity. And the refugee leaders claim mrnre fjad 
more that there can be no peace without their participation. 
Military Boles after 1#7 
The Israeli military has developed a firmer strategy against 
retaliation since the 1967 War. Shortly after the wfar, the 
^erillajB tried to establish bases on the West Bank. The Israeli 
military used helicopter and infantry search and destroy missions 
to discourage such moves. The camps were moved ba(^ across the 
Jordan iiiver and larger bases ware established there. The 
20 
iuonon Eubenstein, '* *Dami àhrerybody* Susm Up the Angty 
Mood of Israel," TW Mm York Times Magazine. February 9, 1^9* 
P» 98» 
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Israeli military continued .ushing tha groups, sending infan­
try ioid planes across tha Hiver to eradicate the newly estab­
lished bases. Current reports indicate that the bases have 
been moved farther from the border and are smaller and much 
21 less permanent• 
Also following tho 196? /ar, A1 Fatah announced that it 
would transfer its headquarters to Israeli occupied territory. 
This announcement failed to arouse the support of the millions 
of Arabs in the occupied areas. The terrorist groups have 
since found that they cannot trust the local population and 
orders are given to avoid contacts with Arabs in the occupied 
zones. However, despite this hesitanoe to #'ork directly against 
Israel, the gone ilrabs still resent the Israeli presence, Most 
of the Palestinians do not cooperate with the commandos because 
they stand to 1O8É> more in the way of a modest economic boom, 
a relative peace and a way of life more bearable than in a 
refugee camp, Thay may also remember Arab terror of the 1936— 
1939 period in which more ilrabs were killed than either Jews 
22 
or British.^ 
«hat is non-cooperation with the commandos has been expressed 
as passive resistance when directed against the Israeli military 
government. This passive resistance on the part of the Arab 
population in the occupied areas has been met with a^^thy by the 
Israeli occupiers, Israeli officials have taken the attitude that 
21 
"Make Them ^uakel" p, 40* 
22 
Rubenstain, op. oit,, p, 93, 
if the Arab children in these tirea» did not go to school or if 
their parents did not work it was their business, so long as 
2% 
they viere not militant. 
Yet terrorist activities have continued from outside of 
the occupied areas and Israeli officials have met these attacks 
ivith force. Coranando attacks have brou^t several distinct 
responses from the Israeli authorities and liie Jewish populace. 
They have reduced to a minimm any Israeli willingaess to lose 
military control of the v/est Bank. Thus, at least this portion 
of the occupied territory is not negotiable under any settlement 
PA 
following the outline of the 1967 Securii^ Council Resolution. 
Though it is impossible to measure accurately the physical 
damage inflicted on Israel by the terrorists, it seems so far 
to have been negligible,. Terrorist activities have, however, 
introduced a daily tension into Israeli life, esj^ecially in 
-Uie border regions, shelling across the Jordan Hiver is an 
almost ni^tly affair. Heavy vreapons, including long-range 
guns and bazooka are often used. Shelling and mine-laying ac­
count for the great majority of the incidents. Of a total of 
1,288 incidents reported between June 12, 196?» aad December 31, 
1968, only 157 were acts of terror and sabotage deep inside 
Israeli territory,This would seem to ia&toate a certain 
Israel and the Occupied Lands," p. 443. 
^'tiubenstein, op, cit.. p. 27. 
25lbld. 
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loyalty among the Arab population in the border regions as 
well as an effective Israeli defense system* 
Â decline in the number of inf i1trations and an increase 
in shelling from safety across the border has been a noticeable 
26 
change in oommndo tactics since the June «j'ar. The commandos 
hare been able to cara^ out border incidents on almost a daily 
basis, thou^, sinoe the subsqst of I968* Their activities have 
been described as military pinpridoB, but they have had an 
27 
irritating psychological effect. Yet, the border raids 
affect the Arab more than the Jewish populations* Border 
kibbutz are well fwtlfled. Arab border settlements and camps 
are not* Thus much of the damage is inflicted oa the allies and 
not the enemies, 
Socialigation of Israeli Arabs 
Serious pressure has been put on the Israeli Government 
by son» offloials to initiate a poli<%r of fait accmnpli in 
the occupied territories az»i to establish Jewish settl^imnts 
in -Uie «mes that would be considered to be annexed to Israel 
28 
no matter what a final settlement would twing. Israel's 
Bi^ty percent of the incidents are shellings across the 
Jordan Elver* Taa p«ro«at are mine-layings alon^ the border and 
only ten percent, are attempted inflltR&tl ana. w®o fiubenstein, 
ODroit.. p. 96.) 
'Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movwwnt* 
It# Significance in the Middle East Crisis," The ̂ Middle j^Ast 
Journal. Volume 23 (Summer, I969), p. 293* " ' ' 
OH 
"Viewpoints," Hew Outlook. January, 1969» p. 3* 
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29 
Government has begun this policy \vith its fortified kibbutz, 
but 30 far these kibbutz ressemble more a temporary sailitazy 
settlement than a permanent, peacetime village. 
Yet the Israelis have tried not to alienate the lalestiniama 
in the occupied arewi any more than absolutely necessary. They 
have continued or attempted to restore the local àx&b adminis­
trations. ilrab officials have been requested to continue their 
functions under the supervision of military governors. Ma^r 
have remained I some have quit In protest.^ 
Still Arab leaders in the expanded Israeli State have not 
been invited to play an active role in the conception or exeouticm 
of economic improv^ent or social rehabilitation. The military 
authorities do not want Arab participation. And, though the 
militaiy is not directly involved in future planning for the 
area, its opinions are respected. Israeli officials have adopted 
the attitude that it is too early in the planning for any Arab 
participation, when the plami are completed, in accordance 
with strictly Israeli views, and the Government is ready to 
implement them, then Arab participation will be invited. Thus, 
resettlement is not a cooperative venture, but an Israeli plan 
51 
imposed on the Arabs. This lack of participation has caused 
soma bitterness and could conceivably cauca an Israeli failur# 
to integrate these areas in the future. 
^%ee Appendix a. 
^^on ieretz, "Israel's Administration and the i\rab Refugees," 
Foreign Affairs. Volume 46 (January, I968), p. 343. 
%bid.. pp. 344-345. 
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Hor the Israeli Arabs béas invited to participate 
in the present Government, mren in Departments v^oh directly 
affeot the Arab populatiw. The situation in the Off±o@ of the 
Prime Minister's advisor on /jpab Affairs is typical. Mo ilrabs 
are employed. 0#er Depar-tei^ts follow the SEune pattmm, The 
Ministry of Education is the wco@gti(m« ait, the jJirector of 
ike kcnh Depar^nent in this Ministry is a Jew, and a S m %ho 
32 
does not speak Arabic. 
Many teachers and intellectuals insist that the Israelis 
are seeking to aipe oat a Palestinian national consciousness. 
Israeli educators have asserted that education in the Arab wrld 
has a fascist outlook «hioh has sought to militarise the Arab 
youth.Thus Imrael has set about to reconstruct the educa^ 
tionsl i^stem in the occupied areas. Tœcts have been withdraim 
from these areas until reviewed by Israeli authorities. As a 
result, UMWÂ has had to c<^ile and distribute voluams of 
teadiing notes acceptable to Israel.^ 
(Whaa the Israelis first sug^^sted changing texts and teach­
ing methods, most of the Agency* s Palestinian teachers vent on 
strike. However, the objectionable material was reraoved and 
schools iK>w function normally with few official Israeli visits. 
^Atallah Mansour, "Arab Intellectuals Hot Integrated," Hew 
Outlook. June, I964, p. 27. 
^^Persta, "Israel* s Administration," p. 342. 
^^SAQS. 24th Session, fieport of the CcN^ssioner-Gmeral 
of the United Nations Belief and .ïorks Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Bear Bast (A/76I4), Supplement Humber I4, p. 4* 
^^"Israel aM the Occupied Lands,** p. 443. 
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Y&%f iKpaell officials' objections to textbook passais depre­
catory to JemOf Zionism and Isaraal caused au upheaval in zwst 
every subject and maiml^ in Ai-abio literature, history and 
gBOgraghy. Educational friction was felt in both the Gaza 
Strip «md on the West Bank. Hearl^- half of the standard text­
books ware banned. Students and teachers boycotting the schools 
caused some to be closed for several months.^ 
Since the stools are back to almost normal operations, the 
Israelis instruct their Arab pupils in #ie history of the 
Jewish National MWration Mov^ent, but devote little time to 
the libaraticm movmmn# of the Arab people. The Ignorance (m 
this mibject Ws forced Arab youth tb seàk these facts from 
sources hostile to Israel and ov^r which Israeli authorities 
Vf 
Wve no convoi. Only a small proportion of l^e Arab youth 
graduatii^ from elm^tsry school enjoys further education. Even 
the few who do graduate from secondary schools have had diffi­
cult in finding jobs better than those available to youths 
who have completed only elementary school. Of all the problem, 
education has possibly been the woi«t between the Palestinians 
and the Israelis. 
However, time has helped to change the educational system 
to one someWkat more equitable for the Arabs. There are now 
^^«reta, "Israel* s Administration," p. 343* 
^^USahanmed Tatad, "Arab Youth in Israel—(Today and TcHaorrow," 
Hew Q .964, p. 23. 
jCtià# f p# 2%2 
tnmnty Arab high schools in Israel. There was one in 1953»^^ 
Arab youth still lack activities after school hours. No clubs, 
libraries or young peoples groups exist for the Arabs as for the 
Jewish (diildren. At best, there are a few scout clubs #dL(di 
hold meetings once a month.^ 
Mapam, an Israeli political paxi^, Ims attempted to help 
the iirab youth* It founded the Arab Youth Pioneer zmvement, set 
up producer cooperatives and published progressive Arab litera­
ture. However, both its resources and effects are limited. It 
has been compellM to cease its activities at times because of 
so—called " administrative" intervention from the Giilitary ̂ yvem-
ment.^ 
Althou^ Idle Israeli Govmmment has attempted to placate 
its Arab population, pending some future settlement, it has 
continuously refused to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian 
culture. Sor has the Government tried to integrate the refugees 
into Israeli national life, 
Employment is another area of discrimination against the 
Israeli Arabs. Jewish children leaving school join tiie Army for 
two and one-half years. The Amgr provides them opportunities 
to leam trades and continue their studies. (Moe free of Army 
obligations, the Jews have virtually all doors of emplojwnt open 
^^Mansour, op. cit.. p. 31. 
^Abdul Asis Zu'bi, "The Discontent of Arab Youth," Hew 
Qutloo^ January, 19^3, p. 14. 
^bld.. p. 24. 
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to thorn. The professional Jewish labor market is closed to Arab 
youth* They are left with only the limited fields of eduoatiaa 
and government clerkship* Yet, most are not qualified to become 
certified teachers which in turn accounts for the lower levels 
of Arab educaticm* Hot are there many op wtunities available 
in govenment. Of ^,000 government workers, some 300 are 
Arabs. This is ap^woiimately 1^, The Arab population of 
Israel, including the occupied areas, is now close to 50^ 
Kor are Palestinian and Israeli cultures compatible. The 
Arab youth trtno has lived in the Israeli society brings back a 
new way of life to the conservative and traditional village life, 
which is still maintained in the Arab villages and refugee camps* 
His ideas are often rejected by heads of families, ^ven if the 
youth is economically free, he is still somewhat tied by Pales­
tinian social traditiozm. Stxae of these youth have tried to es^ 
cape the problems of reconciling the two societies by illegally 
crossing the border into the neighboring Arab States* Son® are 
killed) others are caught and spend time in i\rab prisons, only 
to be returned to Israel to spend more time in prison* However, 
these youth have fouM that it is easier and cheapw to loam 
a trade in an Israeli prison ̂ kan in an iorab village in Israel 
The Arab Border Population 
Another problem the Israelis have with the Arab bwder 
^Ibld*. p. 15* 
^\atad, OP. clt*. p. 24. 
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population is that many of these persons hare close faaily ties 
wi-^x refugees in the Arab oountries. In many cases, the Israeli 
i\r&bs are but ramants of extended families, wst of inhose mmk-
bors fled. Sentiments and sympathies of the Israeli Arabs are 
olosely linked igith those of the refugees now living aoroas the 
borders. This situation has created a deep-seated psyohologioal 
problem of divided loyalty and eraotiwx.^ Israeli authorities 
furthered this problem by prt^bitlng contacts between the :w<me 
Arabs and their relatives and friends in Syria and Syrian parts 
of occupied territory, liYhen the Arabs crossed the border 
illegally, Israeli police sougjit to enforce the regulations and 
violence resulted.^ 
The United Arab Republic complained to the U. H, Secretary-
General in Mardif I968, in cozmeotion with the atrocities against 
the civilian pojailation by the Israeli military authorities. 
Claims were made by the Arab States that the Israelis planned 
to eradicate the refugee populations in Gaza and Sinai along 
with the original inhabitants of these areas,^ A rejiort in 
November, I967, showed that 100 to 300 persons a day, mostly fr<m 
^Abd el Âsls Zu'bl, an Israell-«ÂrsU> d@g%i^ who belongs to 
the left wing Mapam Party elaborated on this feeling in a state­
ment to the 5ies#et. "We Israeli Arabs foiw an integral part of 
the State of Israel. This is my belief and my desire. At the 
same tla», we also are an integral part of the Palestinian people 
in the occupied areas and in the Arab States . . . . (and) We find 
ourselves in war between our state and our people," (See Tho 
Christian Sdwme Mqaltor. Deweber 2, 1^9» P» 22.) 
^^Rred J, Khmirl, "Friction and Conflict on the Israeli-Syrian 
Front," The Mddle Bast jTcumal. Volume I7 (Winter-Spring, 1963), 
p. 20. 
'^GAOB, 22nd Session, Letter £rom lâie Representative of 
United Arab Republic to the Seoretary-Gemral (a/7059)» March 1, i968. 
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the Gasa Strip wKPe Grossing into Jordan. Many stated that 
they had been intimidated, shot at and had had their homes 
4.7 
damlished in attempts to fozwe than to move. 
Israeli authorities, according to U. H. souroes, also p«Qr 
10 Israeli pcmnds to mr&ry immber of a Gaza family which indi­
cates a willingness to leave and ano#er 10 Israeli poundUi to 
these families as they woes the Allmiby Bridge into East 
AQ 
Jordan. The Israelis also facilitate transportation. 
The Arabs believe that the only danger to sewrity in the 
Gaga Strip o<mes from the Israeli effort to persuade the refugee 
to leave the Strip. A Hovembw, 1967, report states that 144 
houses in Gaza refugee oaraps it&Te wlldoiK^d in a sin^e ni^t. 
One Israeli official acknowledged privately tkat securil^ forces 
were tougher in Gasa #an on the lest Bank. Rot only are housMi 
desiapoyed, but also churches and hospitals. The imp<%ltion of 
curfews is also rwMxrted to more oft«i in Gasa. (M January 19, 
1968, the Israeli authorities imposed a general ourfev on more 
than 200 Arabs in the occupied city of Gaea. Ho proper provisions 
#mre made for the distributi(m of food and water during the 
curfew.^^ 
Reports indicate that in February, I968, approximately 
^^GAOa. 22nd ̂ essitm, Letter Arom the Representative of the 
United Arab Republic to the Seeretary-General (A/7048), January 31, 
1968. 
^GAOR. 22nd Session, Letter from the Representative of J<xr-
dan to th!e Secretary^^neral (A/7I66), August 5» 1968. 
'^^GAOR. 22nd Session, Letter Arom the Representative of the 
UAB to the Secretary-General (A/7048)» January 31, I960. 
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35,000 Arabs had been forced to flee Gaza for the East Bank. Cto 
leaving the Israelis had forced the Arabs to sign statments 
saying they were leaving voluntarily and relinguishing their rig&t 
to return» The Director of TJKl'^A noted in his report to the 
24th General Assenbly that vlolenoe had become almost a omitinual 
way of life in the Gaza Strip with strikes and vlolenoe <mrrled 
out by the refugees and retaliatory violence by the Israeli mili­
tary.^ 
The effects of the militanoe cultivated by the Egyptians 
among the Strip* s population as well as the overcrowding in the 
area have caused nore resentment against the Israeli occupation 
than elsQfsdiere» As a result of violence and no&-cooperatlon by 
the refugees, Israeli occupation authorities have felt that more 
stringent measures were necessary to maintain relative peace 
in the Strip# 
On the «Vest Bank, thou^ the refugees have been treated 
more equitably than those in the Gaza Strip, the effects of 
prolonged hostilities have been felt in a resistance to the 
military occupation. As the time of occupation lengthened and 
the prospects of a settlement decreased, demonstrations, strike 
and bombings by the Palestinians became more frequent and led 
to Israeli counterHcaeasures. One Israeli occupation colonel 
^^GAOS. 22nd Session, Letter from the Hejaresentative of the 
UAfi to the Se^etary-General (A/7099), May 17, 1968. 
^^GAOH. 24th Session, Report of the Commissioner-General 
of the United Bâtions Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
HefUgees in the Bear Bast (A/7614), Supplemmit Number 14, p. 4* 
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HOB blamed, the troubles ON just a BXHSLLI percent of the popu­
lation. He stated that "It's the ̂  of tha townspeople, the 
inteUegentsia is who cause the trouble* They seem to see 
the fact of military defeat m a defeat fw all their past, their 
great poets and philoso^ers—If indeed they had any* I don* t 
KO 
know.M"^ It has been this sac# group which the Israeli author­
ities have been unable to provide employment* Cimbined %ith the 
Israeli attitude of ignori% the Palestinians past, the West 
Bank Palestinians have come to feel the same rejecticm from 
the Israelis as txom the Arabs. The Arab Governments have just 
been more direct in their rejection of the l'aiestinians by not 
granting oitiaienship and by looviding hardly any em^jloyment. 
The probles» the Israeli authorities hava faced in dealing 
with the Palestinians in the occupied territories are not only 
more numerous, but more complex, than those ever faced in 
dealing with their Arab residents before 1967» For the Arabs in 
Israel, including those in the occupied semes, now total almost 
R-S 
one-half of the po£ailation. Given the present rates of popu­
lation growth, and a stable Jewish po*%lation, the Jews would 
bewme a miQWity in a decade in a Greater Israel including the 
the West and the Gaza S trip* ^ince the ôix Jay .Var, there 
have been increasing requests by officials and citizens for more 
^•Israel and the Occupied Lands," p. 442* 
A-'eretz, "Israel's Hew Arab Dilemma," The Middle ̂ ^ast 
Journal, Volume 22 (./inter, 1968), p. 49* 
^4bid.* p. 51* 
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Jewish Imnlgratlon to balance the larger Arab population, 
S<Mse Palestinian /.rabs are passively resisting the Israeli 
administrât!on. Others are participating in various ftxrms of 
cooperation from quietly carrying on normal official functions 
to discussing the possibilities of a political solution with 
the Israelis. Few, if any, of the occupation Arabs favor 
integration as a minority into a Jewish State or mass emigration 
to mare luw&tive areas of employment. However, even the most 
moderate Palestinian leaders in Israel are xmisilling to take 
55 any public stand without backing from /irab loaders abroad. 
Soon after the occupation, Israeli planners were amre that 
the refugee problem could not be solved outside the context of 
overall economic and political planning for the est Bank and 
Gaza. Pilot projects for refugee integration included plans 
to change wop patterns, to utilise the Jordan Hiver •waters more 
adequately and to market produce in Israel and abroad. The 
problem of settling the refugees is that the only land available 
is in the Jordan Valley which is unbearably hot in the summer. 
Also, many of the younger refugees are tovmspeople and not 
inclined to work the land. The Israelis have found that they 
cannot dump the iui-abs into cooperative farming as they have the 
Jews. Like tho Palestinians, the Israelis are divided on how 
any solution should procédé. Four main schools of Israeli 
thou^t have emerged; 
1, Intransigent—urges refusal to resolve the refugee 
problem until the Arabs agree to disousa a genmral 
peace. This group points out that Jordan milked the 
ii&mt Bask, and ̂ gypt turned Gaza into a ggketto. 
2, the passive—as normal life returns to the area, they 
feel that the progress in Israel wlH filter through 
to the refugees» The effects should be watched be­
fore now pmgpmm are introduced, 
3» the evolutionary—Idle Israelis would improve the way 
Arab» feel toward They should raise the Arab 
standard of living and promote Arab-Jewish integration. 
4. the Utopia»—«this group has left-^sring support and 
believes the field is open for ikrab-Jewish inte^ation 
at present.^ 
The military governmemt in the occupied areas has its own 
goals, which are hi#ly respected hy Israeli officials. It plans 
to interfere as little a# possible with the daily life of the 
Arabs, giving th@m mazimm frwdom so they will act as a sort 
of bridgehem# betwe^ Israel and the other Arab States. It also 
intends to surpress terrorisas irith an iron hand when it appears 
Though Israeli occupation has brought certain eo^Kwmio 
advantages to tilae refugees, it has also created problem. The 
problems have been especially related to Israel's firm deter-
idnation to obtain 4e facto control of all of the occupied areas, 
despite UHSWâ, the refugees or the Arab States. This policy 
of ti^tening a hold these areas, for security reasons ostenm 
sibly, has not helped Palestinian-Israeli relations. For one 
thing, such a policy contradicts Palestinian ̂ JBIB on the dispo­
sition of these areas. It also makes the 1alestinians and the 
Arab Governments more defensive, more militant and more deteiœined 
^The ̂ oonomist. July 8, 19^7, p, ICffi. 
Israel and the Occupied Lands," p. 442# 
not to allow Israal' a military any further expansion. 
More them actual _^hysioal dlamago, terrorist activities 
have hurt Israel in tarns of defense expand!tixToS# They are 
adding to tho already large burden of maintaining out-of-
proportion regular foroes and have forced the Government to 
spend millions of dollars on the fortification of the cease­
fire lines. The Israeli defense budget of one billion U. u. 
dollars for I369 was 35?^ of the total Israeli budget and 
of the 
Summazar 
l^ior to the 1967 »v'ar, the Israeli Government made sporadic 
attempts to inte^ate its minimal Arab population, irabs in 
Israel ware granted oitiaenship, wej^e found jobs and were 
c^pensated for lost propœrty. Yet, they wore not given status 
equal to the Jewish poinilatlcm. The jobs they held and the edu— 
oatioa 'Uiey reoeived wore not equivalent to those of the Jewish 
populatlcm. 
Following the 1^7 War, Israel beoame the largest host 
country. With the influx of refugees, Israel doubled its terri­
tory, although only the "old oity" of Jeruslamn has been officially 
annexed as yet. Though the Government does not plan to evict 
these refugees, neither has it taken conta?eto, definitive steps 
to integrate them. 
Though Israeli officials recognise that the return of 
^^Eubenstflnia, op. oit., p. 27. 
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nomml life is inseparable fr<m a soluti<m of the refugee 
problem», they laok a défini tire program to accomplish a re­
turn to normal, normal is not clearly defined, nor is it 
agreed cm by the Israelis or the Palestinians. The Israelis did 
atrive to resume trade, and to a lesser extent traval, between 
the two banks of the Jordan Hirer and somewhat between Jordan 
and l&e Gaza Strip. However, both Jordan and Israel have 
eoonwnio and political reasons for favoring such policies, des­
pite the existence of the refugees. Israel's surplus of agri— 
miltural product» nomally g^es to Saudi Arabia and lûxn&it» 
Without these markets, this ̂ oroduce would have to be absorbed 
in Israel. This would bring a fall in prices* Politically, 
Israeli officials hope that if the population of the occupied 
areas maintains somewhat normal tacts, it will be less restive* 
Jordan has been reluctant to close off her prime source of 
agricultural produce and feels that shutting off the West Bank 
might enhance a latmit tendency among the refugees for self-
determination. 
Israel's economic prosperity and demand for manpower hare 
made it easier to integrate the refugees than in the Arab States* 
Mudh has been done to solve ̂ e unemploymmit problem among the 
general refugee population. However, success in solving the 
problems of the workers has accentuated the problem of unma* 
ployment of the intellectuals. Most agree this problem is one 
of the main causes of bitterness. 
As the refugees are conowitrated in the border areas, their 
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lirss are made more difficult by the Increasing numbmrs of 
border incidents. Most refugees in Israel no longer fear tile 
Israeli occupiers, though generally thej still dislike the 
Jews. The refugees do seem to appreciate their situation better 
than life in a refugee camp, or possibly even that of living ia 
one of the iirab States, yet they are far from being totally 
integrated into Israeli society, or of even being agreeable to ik9 
idea* As the Israelis c^mot agree to a Palestinian dominated 
socie*^, little (xmcrete has resulted. Israeli—Palestinian 
relations do semn to be nwre amiable than Arab tate-iPalestinian 
relations, a fact vdiich does show son^ sort of Israeli progress. 
However, until the Israelis agree to work with the Palestinians 
to develop concrete plans for the future of the occupied areas 
and of idle refugees as umll as agree to discuss outstanding 
political differences and goals, it would se^ that the present 
situation will continue or deteriorate further. 
GHAx-T3it VI 
THJ .J® TH^ AiUB STAI'^ 
between 1S4Ô and tUa June 1967 «ar, four iirab Govoms^ato 
were hoata to the majori^ of the Palestiniari refuses In 
1961 the Àgenoy Director noted that the host countries and 
their govemmmitm have shown a deep understanding of the refu» 
gees' problcias and sjnapathize with their neWa. By 196? 
much of this s^sipathy and understanding had disappeared* 
general jirab Attitudes 
.ihether out of syiapath;^ for and agee^nent with the 
refugees or whether for their ovm advano^ent, the host ooiaitries 
have mewle the job of UHEiA more difficult than absolutely 
necessary by some of their policies toward the Aganoy* uro­
grams auoh ae the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley rrojeot and the 3inai 
Desert xrojeot, both designed to provide more water for the 
area thus providing more farmland, have not met with any 
success. They have been opposed by the refugees and by the 
Arab states and have been successfully blooimd by the Arab 
^GAOR« 7th Session, Annual fieport of the Director of the 
United Hâtions liolief and norks Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East (A/217I), Supplement Number 13» P« 2. 
^GAQE. I6th k^ession, Annual fieport of the Director of the 
United Hâtions Belief and 7/orks Agency for Palestine Eefugees in 
the Hear Kast (A/486I), Supplwient Kimber 14# p. 4* 
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Goveriumnte • ̂ 
The host goremmente have sought to exploit the Agency 
by requesting purchases of relief supplies locally rather than 
elsewhere even thou^ local prices may be hij^er,'^ Close Agwoy 
consultation with private employers in the area has, however, 
enabled vocational training courses to be adjusted to potential 
employers' requirements. This has opened laora opportunities for 
Agency technical graduates, and more and more are being recaruitod 
5 
in the nei^boring Arab countries. However, the Arab hosts, 
by virtue of their vote in the United Nations, do curtail 
programs which they do not deem politically desireable, Thouggi 
the kfs&xusy has had some successes, there are still too fern 
jobs in the area for all of the refugees and even for all of 
the indigenous populations. This will continue unless mxc& 
(xmiwehensive development measure# are taken. Such measures caiv-
not be implemented without the agreement of the refugees and of 
the host governments. 
In all the Middle Eastern area, including Israel, the 
refugees can afford to work for lower «ages as they are aided 
in their subsistenoy by UBBWA. This wmpetition makes the 
^GAOfi, 12th session, jjinuiil Report of the Jireotor oi' the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agenay for Palestine EefUgees In 
the Sear ^ast Uupplwment Kumber 14, p. 24. 
^AOR. 9th Session, Annual Report of the director of the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refuses in 
the Near 3ast (A/2717), Supplement Htimbor 17, p* 30. 
^gAQB* 21st Session, Report of the Ocmnissioner-General of 
the United llations Relief and orks ^igericy for Palestine liei'ugecw 
in the Near East (A/6313), Suppleimnt Number 13, p. 2?. 
-9> 
refugees uzwelxxme in the host couni^ies and tends to de­
gress the already low wags ratesThe situation hampers the 
overall development of the aroa, but still the iix-ao hosts 
do not ohoose to terminate UKIiî/A* s presence and undertake a 
aoluticai on their ovai. This v/ould lose them a political bargain­
ing advantage as the problem per se would soon have to be 
eradicated. The hosts, rather, have chosen to keep the refugees 
in restricted areas, Such aas the case in -.gypt where the re­
fugees were contained mostly in the Gaaa Strip. Syria ima 
refused to accept any more, Lebanon restricts them severely, 
Jordan alone has granted citizenship, and has evidenced a slight 
willingness to investigate means of making the refugee citizens 
7 self-supporting, Even so, laost of the refugees in Jordan were 
contained on the ̂ est and now the East Banks, 
Though the refugees wwe initially welcomed in the Arab 
States, it was not long before their continued immigration turned 
this w@lo(«%^ into resentment, The mmber of refugees in the 
oangps has risen steadily each year, partly from nato^al increase 
and partly from in-migration Axm other places in the host 
states to the ^mps as family fUads have run out, A few refugees 
are new arrivals from Israel; mmre are refugees #10 were evicted 
from local Arab villages for cutting fruit trees for firewood 
or performing other destructive acts. Others are simply looking 
^Sydney Hettleton Fisher, ed., Jocial l'orcas in the m iddle 
aast (l#aoa. New Ywk, Cornell University Press, 1955) » P# 248. 
7lbid.. p. 242. 
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for a more familiar and. satisf^ying social environment and 
hoping to find it in the camp situation,^ 
The refugees pose an internal econociic, socle.! and poli­
tical prcblea for the host governments vi/hich in part account» 
fox many of the restrictions on them. The two and ono—half 
million refugees probably have the highest levvl of education 
g 
of any groups of Arabs in the area. This too can account for 
some of the feeling a^inst them. This education is oriented 
toward Palestine—the schoolrooms, scout groups, sport teams and 
other organized activities are given the names of Palestinian 
towns, herOS, martyrs and villages. The schools are often 
decorated with Palestinian picturesThus the direction of 
refugee education does not provide for the refugees* Integration 
into the Arab host states any more than into Israel. 
This Palestinian socialization has not helped in bringing 
peace to the area, Negotiations over tho years have failed 
largely because the governments and the refugees are determined 
to retain their last advantage given by their exile. This posi­
tion is not particularly realistic, but rather emotional. Yet 
it has so far led to three wars. The current organized Pales­
tinian raids, and Israeli reprisals, have only served to intensify 
6th session, Report of the virector of the United 
Nations Belief and ..orks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Bear -.ast (l/lgO^), supplement Number 16, p. 4, 
^Donald Grant, "After f:mplres— (hat?" Vista. July-Au^ist, 
1969, P. 45. 
10 
A, L, Titawi, "Visions of xieturnj The ^alestino Ai-ab 
Refugees in Arabic Poetiy and Art," The Middle East Journal. 
Volufiie 17 (autumn, 1963), P. ̂23. 
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Arab—Israeli tensions* 
That the military escalation will stop is doubtful. IJo 
refugees, including those who have obtainsd a levol of living 
greater or equal to that held boforo their azile, appear able 
to accept the status quo ivith anything better than a profound 
feeling of bitterness, hatrod and unrest. According to a former 
Palestinian who spent years teaching in refugee camps, most 
of the refugees, in the early 1960's, would have returned to 
their old homes if allowed, Thay did not feel welcome in the 
Arab States. Many will not agree to resettlement for this 
reason as well as the fact that thsy would probably lose their 
claims to lands in Palestine. 
CoEsnando raids on Israel have brought increasing misery 
to those states housing the refugees. Prom the end of the 
binai war in 1956 until the beginning of I965, Israel used aimed 
reprisals against only iiyria# In early 1965» the Israeli-Jordan­
ian demarcation lines suddenly became critical, largely because 
of the activities of Al Fatah* Since this time, Israeli troops 
have also retaliated against Lebanon and iiigypt as a result of 
12 oocmando raids staged from these territories* 
% 1969» if the Palestine ^erillas had not existed, the 
area would have been virtually at peace, iùccept for some iaoi— 
dents along the Suez Canal, all of the major Israeli retaliations 
11 "Inside the ..rab Oainps," The Christian Century, Tay 11, 
I960, p. 567. 
IP 
i'red J * Khouri, "The Policy of Retaliation in ̂ a-ab-
Israeli Relations," The Middle East Journal. Volume 20 
(Autumn, 1966), p. 448. 
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v&r@ provoked by the guerillsws,^^ Israeli military retaliation 
has become more harsh to try to discourage guerilla raids. The 
_rab states, ./hich hc-vs felt the force of those Israeli attacks, 
have had to increase their Kiilitary strength in order to pro­
tect themselves, from both the Israeli attacics and £roni the 
x-alestinians« Thus, all three grouijs have become increasingly 
better armed» 
The changes in the political and social structure of the 
refugee consnunity during its prolonged exile, together with 
the encouragement ixrovided by the Arab a ta tes, have bz-ou^t 
about til J Qoizmiando movements. The Palestinians, through the 
commandos, have recently gained status as a separate entity 
in the Middle East, at least on the part of the Arab Governments. 
These Governments, attempting to strike a balance between support 
of the ooQBnandos md restrictions on them have often found 
themselves unable to act decisively in a situation of confron­
tation. For the Palestinians are by now as well armed as the 
host governments. Thus, the host governments have hesitated 
to back the conmandos and particularly Al Fatah. This group 
they feel is too extremist and could eventually involve them in 
an undesired war with IsraelThis feeling has persisted more 
strongly since the June ï/ar and seems directly related to in­
creased cossnando activities. 
^^'iiow to Jireak the Jrust Barrier," j)lev/sweek, January ZO, 
1969, p. 38. 
^^Khouri, "The jc oliqy of Hetaliation," p. 448. 
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Prom tha viewpoint of the fodayeaa, their greatest suooess 
has been that they have deterred Israel and the Arab States fr(m 
negotiating a peaceful settlement of the conflict, zhren if the 
Arab Governments were seriously seeking to make peace, such a 
peace is now almost worthless to the terrorists and to the 
15 Palestinian masses. 
Following the 1967 .»'ar, the Governments in both Lebanon 
sjid Jordan found it neoessfiory to devote mre and more time to 
internal rather than regional troubles. Rioting and government 
crises, directly attributable to the refugees, have pla^iod both. 
The Palestinian or^uiizations have attained a degree of uolitical 
legitimacy and popularity through the /irab masses, whether 
consjrvative or radical. However, the Palestinians' idea of 
nationalism is opposed in varying degrees by the host governments. 
Though the ralestine issue is the isain thread holding the 
iirab Unity Movement toother, it seems unlikely that the rales— 
tinians would relinguish their new identity to a united Arab 
world. Thus, it seems ironic that while the Palestinian causa 
and the defeat of Israel are the main points of agreement ia 
i-rab Unity, the Palestinians are not and do not care to become 
an integral part of a united ilrab movement 
Thou^ the Arabs and the Israelis seem more anxious to find 
a solution than ever before, their desires are now negated by 
the Palestinians wish to prolong the conflict until Israel is 
^^Aîïînon Rubenstein, " 'Damn liverybody' Sums Up the Angry 
Mood of Israel," The Mew York Times Magazine. February 1969, 
P. 93. 
Grant, OP. dt». p. 48. 
eradicated. ?ha I967 Security Council Seaolution outlining a 
solution was purposefully vague iind therefore acceptable to all 
parties. In the spring of 1968, Jordan and Jgypt agreed to 
its implementation, Israeli officials later indicated accep­
tance, However, the States' interpretations of the Resolution 
did differ. Despite the unprecedented governmental agreenent, 
the Palestinians, backed by the Syrian Governnent, have declared 
that the Resolution is oorpletoly unacceptable to them. Thus, 
17 it has remained unimplemented and largely undiscussed. 
Jordanian-Palestinian Relations 
In Jordan, possibly more than any other host country, the 
Palestinians have had a noticeable effect on the political, 
economic and social situations. The present Palestinian leader­
ship has attained status in Jordanian government circles by 
serving the interests of the Kashomite throne. Kov/ever, this 
is a double standard on the part of the i alestinians %?ho have 
little liking for the monarchy, ikn autonomous Palestinian 
State, v'/hich they prefer, would necessitate an end to the pre— 
18 sent Jordanian Government. 
Following the I948 defeat, the Jordanian Government did all 
that it could to stifle the xalestinians' feelings of indépendance » 
Though still not having a working relationship with the Pales­
tinians, th. Jordanian officials, as a result of the Israeli 
17 
Mchael Adams, "The Search for a Settlement in the Lliddlà ::^t. 
The Political .uajterly, Volume 39 (October—December, 1963), p. 
^ Joseph Sasri îïasr, "Palestinians Want a New ̂ lite," Net: 
Outlook. February, 1969» p. 38. 
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occupation of the ..oat have boon relieved of part of 
their problem v/ith the rofugaus. Israeli officials are now 
forced to try to s\ar^-ress this fouling of Palestinian nationalism 
aioeng this group. 
The refugees in Jordan v/ex*e welcomed at first. Uiaall irri­
gation projects vfere begun to pro'/ido land for rosettlanient. The 
professionals aiaong the refugees vmre fitted into the expanding 
Jordanian Government and welfare services. Throe booano members 
of the Cabinet* ^arly in 1950 a law was passed j^^rovidin^ for 
the assignment of state lands to the refugees for homes and 
farms,^^ Some 5^7,000 refugees wont to Jordan and comprised 
over ono-4i&lf of the population at thu end of the 19h^ »ar» 
'fhou^ a numerical liiajority of the Jordanian population, 
the refugees, ev«n though thoy. have full votin^; z'ights and 
citizenship, are treated more as a political minority. They 
do have a role in the Groverœient, but it is by no means repre­
sentative of their actual numbej.s. The Jordanian authorities, too, 
realized that their only hope of ever winning the refugees lay 
in developing an econotny which would absorb them, more than 
a little has been adtiieved, much of it due to the Govenment' a 
20 
cooperation .vith UNH#/A* 
UKRV/A has been Jordan's bluest enterprise. It spends more 
^^Georg'ianna G. Jtevens, "Arab Hefugeas: 1948—1952," The 
L'iddle -.ast Journal. Volume 6 (Sucmer, 1952), p. 286, 
2Û 
"VieviQJoints," Kew Outlook. January, 1969, p. 5* 
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money than the- antire civil budget of the national government. 
As a result the more than ^00,000 refugees have a hi^or level 
21 of living and education than most of the natives» 
..'ork opportunities have remained eSi-ecially scarce in 
Jordan, However, the . gency still has been laore successful with 
resettlenent projects in Jordan than in any other host state» 
LB of February, 1957» the Agency had completed seven resettlement 
projects which provided for 302 refugee families. Projects 
planned and underway as of that date would resettle another 
105 families. Yet, the number resettled is still less than 
22 the net increase of the refugee population. 
The individual grants program in Jordan has been one of the 
most successful mjans of helping the refugees to become self-
supporting, .('hen the prolan Viras first proposed in 1954» niuch 
of the refugee population was against it as they feared it would 
prejudice their ri^t to return to their homes. The beginning 
of the program v/as delayed several tionths. Once begun, the pro­
gram still encountered considerable opposition from the refugees 
23 and iuS outcome was in doubt» However, by I964» soae 
refugee families had achieved self-support through the project* 
Jven »/ith the positive attitudes toward the refugees, the 
21 
3en H» liagdikian, "Tra(;edy of ilati-od," The xieporter» 
November 1, 1956, p, 33# 
22 "Developments of the _;uarter: Comment and Chronology," 
The Lliddle i^ast Journal, Volume 11 (Spring, 1957)» P» I63. 
" ' '2^ 
giiOK, 13th session, /mnual Report of the iJirector of the 
United Hâtions iîolief and works ..gency for Palestine Hefugeos ju* 
the Hear ̂ ast (-^/3931)» Supplement Number 14# p. 6. 
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Jordanian Governtient ./as oxjjerioncine a nogu,-ii\ra ros^.onse. Xa 
1957» tho Ldddla Journal ^ la ted that ioaaan ans laxgoly a 
«alestino city ti*i.asferrod in Si>ao8.^^ -ieforo the 19i^ ar, lining 
ilussein li-'as attumj/ting to minlmiae aliénation a;aoi%' th0 i'alôo-
tinianu* Hu minglad vd.tli tho rofugeoG ite^uantlyj his laoepti^m 
was gOiiorall^ warn and 3i.ontanuous« However, this i-eoeption 
SQujaod to reflect jaor« on Hussaiii personally than on hia office 
or his politios*^^ 3y I960, the Jardaoion Government mews oon» 
siderine asking the itxab league to help it curtail r^xugee mill— 
26 
tanoe* ^ I966, the PLÛ vme premmiring Hu&aein to 
declare Jeruealawa an "Arab Ci^' and to make it the capital of 
Jordan* Hussein refused, thus antagonizing xLO leaders 
The refuses' idea of an independent . ̂lestinian homeland 
was partially revived by Hussein's comment that he had no 
objection to tho creation of an autonomws state on the . est 
Ikmk if it would help to pr(x%M)te a peaceful settl^aent of the 
.Irab-Israeli dispute# The statement vas later denied, but 
it had dcme its damage. It encouraged stme xalestiniaas to tWœ 
a more independent stance from the policies of Amaan, The 
Israelis, who favwed the ides, encouraged it by subsidizing 
28 
cme Arabic newspaper which had favored the plan# However, 
^'^«iievelopm.ojits of the v#arter," p# I64» 
^^The i>o<moEdBt. September 5, 1959» P* 741# 
^^Midi^e tàaat 2ress Uevi&w, Volume 9 (Sew York, ihoanlola 
i-ress, I960}, p. 7# 
^^jf'red J* Khouri, The Ara^Israeli Dilwmia (ayraouee, îi# Y., 
Syracuse University iress, I9W), p# 112# 
qp# cit.. p. 39. 
as tho oonii;4i.ndo groups lu.ve grovm in strength and as thoy have 
encouraged the idea of liberatin̂ j l alestino, the formation of 
a separate .. al&stinian state has lowt nuch of its intrigue. 
jJcK.dte liu£3sein' s lack of con trol on coiamundo operations 
and his loss than atiiablc relatione v/ith the ̂  al̂ stinians in 
general, a sixty laeauor . urliaaient was elected on ..pril I5, 
11̂ 67» .vhioh did support the Iling, .̂ hiikairy, then heading the 
iI/0, had called for a boycott of the oleotion, but his wishes 
2Q 
were not .vidoly followed. " 
.ilthough such results indicate support for thw Iling, the 
xalestinians have lon̂  ̂ard consistently called for political 
parties «/ith platforms and an end to the Jordanian system sub­
jecting rarliameiit and the to the will of the King# The 
Palestinians have no loyalty to the monarchy and neither intel­
lectual, emotional nor ideologioal attachment to it,̂  ̂
In 1967» at the same time as Jordan lost over one—third of 
its productive territory, the otate acquired between 150,000 
and 200,000 «est i3ank P alestinians, Nearly half of these persons 
were refugees for the second time.^^ iaost became non-productive 
refugees on the iiJast Bank, Hesponaible Jordanians would like to 
see the refugees retmned to Israel, Confusion exists among the 
refugees, althought at one Jordanian government camp »'/hich receive# 
29 •̂ J. H. Huiainga, "The Palestine xiefugeesi . erennial Source 
of 'Trouble, The i:ie;jorter. May 18, I967, p, 3!>« 
^Pjohn B. .,olf, "The /irab liafugoe i-roblem," Current History. 
jJocerabor, 1967, p. 357, 
PeretB, "Israel's Administration and Arab Hefugees," 
Foreiaa Affaira. Volume 46 (January, 1968), p. 337• 
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many of the refugees in 196?, nearly all said they vfonted to 
return to their previous residence • This enthusiasm dimied 
?Aen they were reminded that this also meant returning to 
Israeli rule.^ In July, 1968, the Jordanian Government pro­
hibited the entry of all persons intending to remain in East 
Jordan. There has since been almost no legal mi@rati(m to 
this area from either the n'est Bank or Gaza Strip* 
The oonsnando activities in Jordan inareased lollovdLng the 
Six Day Jar. They signalled the dam of a new political era 
in viMch few doubt the commandos* ability to oust the imnarchy 
when they are ready, ̂  However, it would be a mistake to 
think of the Resent cwomandos as a continuation of the commandos 
earlier sponsored by the UAE and led by Shukaixy. The present 
group is more bitter and more determined, having suffered three 
military defeats and some, the third dislocation. Their ewtions 
are more spontaneous and deliberate and do not need impetus from 
J^gyP't or from Syria, 
More and more the Jordanian Govemmaat has been at odds with 
the Palestinians. The commando leaders wanted to be allowed to 
mobilize the Palestinians in Jordan, to organize military train­
ing, to impose taxes for their support and to fortify border 
villa^s. To Hussein, this would be tantamount to relinquishing 
Jordanian sovereignty over the Western part of the country, 
^^he jjoonomlst. July 8, 196?» P* 103. 
%bld.. p. 108. 
^asr, op. cit.. p. 40. 
^^Ibid, 
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Hussein, rather, explained, this attitude in l%^ following the 
.Jar« He wanted the conaaandoc only to bo proof that a falostiniaa 
uaoyle was alive and supported by the iarab nations, until sudi 
time SB tho v/orld' s conscience awoke and gavs the j/alestinians 
the right of self—determination,^ 
iiost of the Palestinians in Jordan still support Nasser 
; nd his idea of nationalism» Yet his control over then is no 
longer so strong as it once was. Their enormous political power 
is directed against Hussein whose pro-,est orientation they 
re#rd as unfti^dly to their goals. In Aanan and Jamasws, the 
refugees can be found squabbling for every scarce job opening 
with the natives. Their presence wei^is on the econondc, social 
and political structure of not just Jordrji, but of every Arab 
•itate in which they reside. 
On the question of #her@ and in ^s3iat numbers the fedayeen 
should be allowed to operate in Jordan, Hussein ulticiately backed 
down and gave them virtually a free hand in the border areas by 
the end of 1969# This was contrary to the expectations of 
majo^ who had felt sure that he wtmld curtail fedayeen activities* 
However, the weakness of Eusseiil* ̂ position was shown as early 
as Hovmber, 1968, lAen loyal Bedouin soldiers clamped a curfew 
on kmaxi and rounded up members of ICataeh al Masr (i'halanx of 
Victory), a secretive, fringe group of fedayeen* ./h«û these 
E, Jhlomo, "The Real ̂ lesiatance," Hew Outlook, January, 
1969, p. 3. 
1969, p. 30. 
Lebanon* Along the i^rafat Trail," Time. Movm&ber 7, 
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Bédouins also attacked a Fatah training camp, killing nine 
men, i^taà leader# alerted 7»000 armed fedayeen to stand ready 
to move against Amman. 7hou^ Hussein and the fadayeen had 
an angry meeting in Amman where Hussein declared, "If I don't 
rule this oountzy, then X shall bwm it," he was forced to 
reconsider when the fedayeen rmninded him that the popilation 
of Auman, now 4^»000, had been 35»000 in 1$58 and they vmce 
still able to reduce it to this sisie. 
At the same time Sheik ilkif al—Faiz, Minister of Coimaeroe 
and loader of the largest Bedouin tribe threatened to withdraw hi# 
support from the Government if Hussein continued to use his 
loyal Bedouin troops against the fedayeen. Hussein, also under 
pressure from laudi Arabia which subsidizes -Uie Jordanian eoowMggr, 
ïwomised to lift the curfew he had imposed to control the fedayeen 
and to allow them to keep their arms if they would keep axm&é 
men off of the streets of 
Lebanon, Syria and Egypt have fared little better in their 
deaL'J^igs with the 1 alestinians, althou^ none has grants citi­
zenship to their refugees or displ^ed as positive an attitude 
as the Jordanian Government has. ^ven so, they have much the 
same problems as Jordan. Such refugee actions seem to support 
the owtentions that they do not want to be integrated into the 
Arab countries, nor do they regard thu iirabs as complete allies* 
^"Jordan," Time. Hovember 22, 1963, p. 30. 
P* 35. 
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Hgyptisja-Paleatinlan Selatlona 
Egyptian political power in the Middle ̂ &st has given 
Hasaer more influence with the Palestinians than any other 
gorsmaent has. However, the iiigyptiaaa Government has ner&r 
wanted to assume responsibility for the refugees, as is 
evidenced by its allowing only a few into Ijgypt proper# 
Of Egypt's refugees, more than 9^^ were channeled into the 
Gaza Strip after 1948 and not permitted to leave» This area 
was never incorporated by Egypt, but retained the frame of 
law and £4iriinistration which existed lAen it was part of the 
British Mandate» Local Palestinien laws r%mined in force 
3jad many of the same officials retained their posts.^ This 
was one Egyptian method of keeping alive a Palestinian idœitity. 
Judging from Israeli ̂ oblems with and approaches toward the 
Gaza refut,--^ - ai opposed to those on the west Bank, Egypt's 
success was fairly high. The only proposed project, during 
tho years of Egyptian administr. tion to solve even part of the 
problem, was to ^-'u.Ap water from the Suez Canal to irrigate the 
land. Ho one ever determined vi^ther the water was suitable, 
and the Egyptiaji Government refused to consider the project 
seriously until the Aswan Dam was constructed. Even such a 
project, had it been completed, was calculated to settle only 
^^Pereta, "Israel's Administration," p. 337# 
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<me-tmrd of the strip'» 
Mar did the i^gjrptiaa Goverwmit enoourage self-support 
projects or movement out of the area. Rather, it viewed the 
refugees as living symbols of Arab Unity. This Unity was 
loosely bound, by its pledge to restore Israel to i-.rab rule aM. 
to repatriate all of the refugees. Govemm«mt imi^osition of 
job restrictions on the refugees served to keep them in the 
oaaps. The Egyptian military whioh wntrolled Gaza restrioted 
refU^gee movements severely, evwi in the area. And, no one was 
AO 
p«KQitted to leave, except for pilgrimages to Macoa,^ Mijoy 
of these restrictions were raaoved after the Isr eli occup^.ti<»i 
in 1967. 
Until March, 1958, the refugees in Gaza had no political 
ri{^ts. Then, the Egyptian Government set up a system allowing 
the Palestinians to eleot 23 of 30 mwbers of a new Legislative 
Council. However, all Council actions were subject to the 
approval of the Egyptian Government. Om of the Council's 
first motions was to call for Gassa's membership in the UAE* 
This action <m April 4» 1958, was never approved. 
Under Egyptian administration, the Gaza 3trip was no mrd 
"Uian a vast refugee camp. The area, 2$ miles long and five 
miles wide, contained approximately 238,(XX) refugees and 102,000 
natives. Almost no possibilities for employment existed.^ i^hren 
'^^"Developments of the quarter," p, 164. 
^A, G. Meserik, ed., Arab Hej^gees jjn the Middle Bwt. (New York, 
International Review uervioe, 195^)» p. 15# 
^&bld. 
^bid. 
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the îm hundred, refugees in Egypt proper had no politloal rl^te. 
However, this latter group did have access to courts of law 
45 
and these refugees were allowed to work and to travel freely. 
SQrptian offloials have taken the attitude of not wanting 
the refugees, v/hm the situation follov?ing the 1948 ./ar stabil­
ized, most of the refugees were concentrated in the Gaza atrip* 
Those remaining in Egypt iacoper have never received aid frma. 
UHBWA* As funds ran out, the iigyptian Government, rather -tiian 
supplying aid to the refugees, requested international aid.^ 
Egyptian representatives at the U. B., like other Arab delegates, 
have criticized the Resolutions because they do not contain 
guarantees that there would be no fUrthw cmrtailaent of services, 
Divided amoz% themmelves, the refugees also act as a divi­
sive factor on the Arab Governments. The Arab League has, on 
more than one occasiw, considm^ed the formation of a ialestiniam 
State. The main stumbling block, other than -&e refugees, is 
the lack of Arab agreement on where and when and how. isgyptian 
officials favor such a scheme. Jordan, on whose territory such 
a State would most likely be created, naturally opposes it. 
For a short time in the I960's Gaza was the seat of a x'ale&tine 
Government in exile. Economic advancement in the area, brou^t 
about by the United Nations iàmrgency Force and renewed citrus 
production, plus lack of Egyptian support for the idea, helped 
"^^Ibld.. p. 14. 
^GAOR. 10th session. Special fieport of the Director Concerning 
Other Claimants for Relief (A/297ô/Add. 1), aupplement Kixraber 15A, p. 6, 
^'^GAOH. 12th liession, 728th Plenary Meeting (December 12, 1957)# 
p. 57C 
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to undermine the movecmit. It was shattered completely by the 
June War,'^ 
In the late 1950's and early I960's, Egyptian Government 
officials had begun setting up, supporting and encouraging 
fedayeaa omvements, The increasing fedsyeen att&oks, despite 
repeated U, H. efforts to curtail such activities since 1956, 
show Egyptian determination to i^rsue aggression against Israel, 
althou#! indirectly. As a result of both jiast and /est supply­
ing arcis to the protagonists, border incidents have imltiplied 
since 1956* Many -Egyptian officers have pressed Hasser to reply 
to Israeli atta<dcs more strenuously. However, he h.e resisted 
as he is aware that the Egyptian Anay is no match for Israeli 
military in face to face combat. He continues to let the 
fedayeen groups cany out the guerilla attacrics and has assisted 
in training the refugees for this type of war fare, There are 
also recrui centers in agypt as in most other iirab countries• 
The PLO also broadcasts daily from -.gypt over its ovm radio 
stwiicn, the "ïoica of the utorm,"^^ 
As a result, the i^igyptians have had to defend against 
increasing numbers of Israeli attacks along the Suez Canal. 
The Canal area has been the main point of commando infiltration 
from ilgypt. 
The dis<aission in the early I96O'u of setting up an indepen­
dent Palestine iiiEsy either under joint all—i^rab oommund or within 
de St. Aubin, "Peace and Refugees in the Middle East," 
The Middle East Journal. Volume 3 (July, 1949)» P. 253# 
^^Khouri, The Arab—Israeli Dilenma, p. 203. 
^^ubenstein, OP. oit», p. 26. 
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the framswork of the existing separate armies has brou^t no 
im>re agreement* EalAer, Jordanian representatives have threatmied 
to walk out of Arab League cmetings if such a proposal wœre 
51 even put on the Agenda. This idea, ono© promoted by 
iigypt, has fallen into disrepute sinoe I967 as the Arab states 
are now trying to control and (mrtail the (xmoandos rather tiian 
promte more violence by them. 
The oooaaando threat has grown swiftly sinw the 1967 War 
and seems to worry the Arab hosts more than the Israelis now. 
Hussein in Jordan is finding the Palestinians more and more of 
a liability as he hears Radio Cairo oaU tar his own assassina­
tion. :]gyptian officials too have come to fear commando beXli-
gmrenoe as it has beoome awkward and dangerous for tham, regiœ»-
ally and int&rnationally. Yet, th^ are at a loss cm how to 
52 CMitrol it.^ lîasser is no longer able to denounce the ccmnandos 
or to withhold funds without giving Cairo's enemies the ohanoe 
to denounce the UAB as lacking the zeal for a holy mx and to 
accuse Cairo of aiding Israel.'^"' 
Lebanon and the Befugees 
Lebanon, though having fewer refugees than dgypt or 
^^J, 3. Raleigh, "The Middle East in 1960—^ folitical 
Survey," Mddle Eastern Affairs, Volume 12 (February, I96I), 
P. 45. 
52 
Huizinga, op. oit., p. 33. 
5^Ibid. 
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Jordan, hsbs problems equal to or greater than those of her 
neighbors* The political slaruoture of Lebanon is set up on 
a symbiotic relation between Christians and Moslems* By offi­
cial estimates the Christians compose approximately 5^ of the 
population. However, there has been no accurate census in 
years. The Government and proportional representation of #^e 
country are s true tared on the basis of this Christian nmjority* 
To accept the Palestinians, 9C^ of whom are Moslems, would 
upset this balance.Thus, the Palestinians in Lebanon have 
never been given any political ri^ts. They are not granted 
residence visas and must hold special identity cards or be 
deported* except in very rare cases, refugees who leave Lebanon 
have not been granted return visas* These rules apply to all, 
but until 1958, they were ru>t enforced in the case of the 
55 
refugees supported by UM»/A» The Lebanese have become even 
HKsre antagonistic toward these refugees and now, the fhalange 
Party of Public works Minister rierre G^aayel would like to 
56 
expel the refugees from Lebajtwn by force if it could* 
As the Constitution stipulates that the ̂ resident be elected 
from the lar^st religious sector, now the Christi^ms, most 
Lebanese oppose ? ®8et tllng the refugees at all as they fear the 
20th Session, Special Political Committee, 442nd 
Meeting (October 29, 1965)» P* 1# 
^^ezerik, op* cit*. p* I3. 
^The Christian Science Monitor. March 31» 1970, p. 4. 
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ialestinians would demand a new census wMch would result in a 
57 Moal^ majority, thus upsetting the present balance. 
The refugees hare, however, been better treated in the 
abstract, as the embodiment of an idea, than they have as a 
reality. The Lebanese people extend vocal support to the 
1 alestin!an cause, but they are not enthusiastic about the 
Palestinians acting on their omi. At the outset of the May, 
1958» crisis in Lebanon, the pro-West Government against whom 
the insurrection was conducted, warned that the penalty for 
refugee participation would be severe. The refugees under UîîEï/A 
care did not actively participate, althou^ for the most part 
they were followers of the Arab nationalist policies of Haseer 
59 
and aympatbized with the goals of the insurgents.*^' 
Though there have been few self—support projects in Lebanon 
becasue of the lack of governmental approval, the Lebanese do 
expend 20^ of their national budget on the refugees. They also 
provide a monthly grant of 10 kilos of flour or bread and three 
Lebanese pounds per month per refugee.Too, since I965, a 
number of Lebanese refugees have been able to find employment, 
especially around Beirut and Tripoli. 
^^./olf, OP. cit.. p. 356. 
^Irene L. Gendzier, "Lebancm and the Palestinians," New 
Outlook. February, I969, P. 23. 
^^Meaerik, op. cit.. p. 13. 
Aubin, op. oit», p. 253. 
^^6A0B. 11th Session, Annual Report of the Director of the 
United Hâtions Belief and Vorks Agmicy for ralestine Refugee# in 
the Near East (A/3212), Supplement Number I4, p. 6, 
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5iKLoe the 19^7 War, Lebanese government crises oaused by 
the ̂ erillas hare been frequent. ^Palestinians have been ezerqis— 
62 
ing effective political control in some fifteen refugee camps* 
In October, ipég, the situation worsened when the Anqy cracked 
down on fedayeen for operating in populated areas supposedly 
barred to them by earlier agreements * ̂ ̂ This followed jpro-
fedaye^ demonstrations in April, 196), which precipitated a 
government crisisThe main battle was in early November, 
1969, over the town of Hashaya, a government held villain some 
^,000 feet up the slopes of Mount Hermon near the oyrian border. 
The oapWre of Bashaya would have nmant that the oossaandos 
could have brou^t their supplies directly over Syrian roads 
rather than by ivay of mountain trails which are impassable in 
the winter. The capture would also have strengthened the comman-
65 
dos position when and if they sat down to negotiate with Beirut. 
However, the Lebanese army, half moslem and half Christian, 
remained loyal to the Government. Seventeen men defended 
Hashaya, holding off a fedayeen force of killing five and 
capturing five without a loss.^^ 
The most recent Lebanese guerilla crisis be^ua in larch, I97O» 
Lebanese guerillas clashed vith government troops at at least one 
•'Calling the Tune," Newsweek. November 10, 1969# p. 47* 
^^Lebanonj Along," p. 30» 
^^GÂQB. 24th Session, Report of -Uie Coimissioner-General of 
the United Sations Belief and /orks Agency for Palestine llefUgees 
in the Near East (A/76I4), ̂ Supplement lumber I4, p. 1. 
Calling the Tune," p. 47» 
Lebanon* Along," p, 35* 
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reûigee camp, The Palestinian guerillas, in addition to their 
control of fifteen refugee camps, have physioal control of some 
adjoining residential areas of Beirut and Tripoli, 
The guerillas have the support of Lebanon*© lower—income 
groups, students and leftist intellectuals, Both the Pales­
tinians and the opposing Phalange rarty members, mostly 
Christian Lebanese, have arms. The Phalai^sts claim 200,000 
supporters. Approximately 10,000 of these, they claim, are 
armed. This group claims to be defending its "Lebanese way of 
life" from encroachment of the foreign Palestinians. Though 
they do not op^se the fi^t against Israel, they no longer 
63 
want it waged f^om Lebanese territory. 3o determined are 
many Lebanese in this belief that they are willing to arm and 
incur the risk of civil war to impress this feeling wi the 
Palestinians. 
Thou^ Lebanon has fewer refugees than Egypt or Jordan, 
it is mwe vulnerable to them j^rtly because of the delicate 
national political balance. Part of the Government's troubles 
stem from the fact that the reAigees are given jobs in the 
expanding economy, but are not accorded any leg^l or political 
rights. The fact that the coimandos now operate many of the 
Lebanese reftigee campe as CŒmando training centers has not 
imj^roved. the situation. But, more of a problem as an instigator 
^^The Christian Science Monitor. March 31, 1970, p. 4* 
^®Ibid, 
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of these troubles haa been Lebanon's nei^bor Syria* 
The S.vrians and the Pales tiniang 
The Syrlaz# are the most militant of the host states and 
the cmly state willing to risk an all-cRit #ar with Israel for 
the Palestine cause» Thpy have brou^t problmm to their neighm» 
bw8 by their unconcealed entxRiragmmant aWL support of the 
guerillas. 
HOT has the Syrian Governs^t been one of the most cooper­
ative with Agency projects. The Government did sign an agree-
ffi«mt with the Agency on October 13, 1952» in v^ich it expressed 
a desire to ooopwate in the developmmit of rehabilitation 
projects for about 85,OCX) registered refugees, and did 
budget milliim for the projects. Only two small projects 
materialiiMd. These were on marginal lands and development was 
69 
accomplished at vary hi^ cost. 'Though the projects were 
advantagews for the Syrian Govmmment, they would never bring 
about the resettlemmit of all of the refugees. 
In the Director's report for I956, ha noted that even if 
the refugees in Lebanon and Syria wwe to become selfnmpporting, 
-tile greatest part of the problem would remain as four-fifths of 
the refugees are located elsewhere. Aa in Lebanon, many of the 
Syrian refugees have found full w part-time work, Hefugees 
in agricultural areas in Syria have the same opportunities fw 
^^GAQH. gth Session, Annual Report of the Director of the 
United Nations Belief and works Agenqjr for Palestine Refugees 
in the Kear Sast (A/2717), Supplenmnt Number 17» p. 12. 
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seasonal work as and mnnv in the industriel centers, 
70 (>s-^i3cic.ll;.' .llano aaid • find full—tirao jmployr:<;nt« 
The iir.e th - tians, arc ooncorned, about .'joncy 
Slip ort for til-' rufu-ecs. -hoy have, abstained on resolutions 
which did not contain ^'ul'ficiont marantees against a reduction 
in if-ency se;rvicas. Yot, in 195'7» n:-r;:^tiatioii3 viora underyraj 
for the; transfer of the itanandon agricultural sottlonont to the 
•Syrian Coverntaont. I'h-j sattl.j::.vnt housed 374 refu ou -foxdlies 
and ooou,. iad 1,496 dunuas of land. -l'hua, the -yrirn Government 
benefitted fi-ora another .rojeot to .Aioh it had contributed little. 
inoe 196I, ralationchi ;b be two an Israel and .^Tia have been 
noro strainsd than Israeli relations with othor ̂ rab -tatys, The 
military incidents batween bhese t?/o hrv also been :;ore serious. 
In October, I967, the ..^'rian ^ rino inistar stated that " e ara 
not sentinels over Israeli security and are not the jash that 
restrains th.. revolu'&ion oT Ui3 displaced and jursecutod ales— 
72 
tinijui i.eo:;le," This corroent invlied to the Icraelis and to 
the ..raias that -yrian officials woula do little to curtail 
coîîïïTîando activities in the area. It also implied that the 
uyrian Goveriment would not agree to any ̂ -oace settlement op­
posed by the aal^stinians. 
70 CTvia, 11 th session, .nnual le.ort of tho director of the 
United Nations ..elief and orks agency for aalestins Refugee# in 
the Hear ,ast ( /3212), vU^, element a umber l.I, p, 6, 
71 12th . eesion, .uinual Report of the Jireotor of the 
baited j.atiijus ..eliuf ;.nd orlai ..^enoy for .aleatine .Lwitigoea in 
the Kear . ,ast ( ../3696), Supplement iiuraear I4, p. 26, 
72 
•Jharles ... Yost, "Tha jerab—Israeli ..ar: ilow It Jegan," 
aorei,:-n .affairs. Volume ..:|6 (Jcinuary, ly68), p, 305. 
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Palestinians in Syria are not citissans» but have usually 
enjoyed the same civil ri^ts ae Syrian citizens. They are 
allowed to work, to leave the country and to return, The 
Government has granted 60 piasters per day to registered 
refugees over ten years of age and 40 per day to those under 
tan. Local assistance and medical services have, when possible, 
73 
been provided without charge. According to U. N. technical 
surve]^ before 196O, all of the foara^r Palestinians oould 
be absorbed in Syria. The cultivable area is over I4 million 
acres# Only six million are used at present. 
Syria is the only <me of the major host countries in whiWi 
the refugees have failed to create almost insurmountable social 
and economic problems. There are two reasœus for this—the 
Syrian willingness to back the oomiando groups rather than 
trying to ourtail their activiMes and the fact that the oom-
mando activities may be planned cm Syrian territory, but are 
staged elsewhere. 
By the middle of August, 1^6, reports indicated that 
both Lebanim and Jordan wwe trying to curtail Fatah activities 
and ixrevent Fatah from using their territories a» bases of 
operation. The commandos began more and move using Syrian 
territory i^ioh brou^t about increasin^y difficult Israeli-
Syrian delations, During the few years before the 1^7 k)'ar, 
^%t. Aubin, OP. cit.. p. 253» 
^^ereta, Israel and the Palestine Arabs, p. 24, 
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Palostinian extramiat elements located mainly in iyria advo­
cated the overthrow of Xing Hussein of Jordan on the groimds 
that he \ms a pmm of the .Vest and too soft on Israel, 3y 
late 1966, reports indicated that several liXah Governments felt 
insecure, largely because of oomnando actions and words in 
Syria, All were jjov/erless to taico measures against this 
group which v/as encouraged by the Liyrians. The situation 
worsened when a new, mora radical Government took power in I966. 
It supported the claims of the Palestine Liberation iiTciy which 
mobilised and inflacmd the refugees and carried out many of the 
raids oa Israel. 
The Syrians, by late I967» wre denying the responsibility 
for the existence or operation of the Palestinian activists# 
UowevOT, the Syrians have done mare in the way of providing 
supplies, training and encouraging these groups than any other 
major host country, including ̂ igypt, in recent years* Syrian 
officials have denied any complicity even when Israeli repre-
77 
sentativas have lodged complaints in the Security Council» 
Their statements are still not so strong as those of the other 
Arab States which began denying involvaaent in oonmando activi­
ties several years ueforu, and are now trying to devise means 
to control the commandos. Syria still remains the most receptive 
^^Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilenma. p. 306. 
^^ost, OP. cit.. p. 305, 
"^'jihotiri. The Arab-Israeli Diletaaa. p. 233. 
-119-
iirab host to guerilla damands and is currently the closest to 
the corraaaado organizations politioally. 
Summary 
The Arab Goverimants have be^ antagonistic toward the 
refugees since shortly after they emigratW. from Palestine* 
Although the Goverxa&ents and the people sympathise with the 
refugee ideal of a return to Palestine, neither officially nor 
unofficially have the host governments weloomed the refugees* 
Only in Jordan have they been granted citizenship» They are 
not equal to other citizens there or in any host country* The 
United Hâtions has retained the responsibility for the refugees 
in camps, or for about 4C^ of the populati<m. Ctaly about 
of the refugee population has really reestablished itself in 
the Arab world* The remainder of the Palestinians are still 
a very definite fringe group* Part of this status stmrn from 
the fact that the Palestinians themselves do not want to be 
integrated and thereby give up their legal olala to either 
repatriation or compensation* 
Partly because of this refugee rejection and partly because 
of the host governments and populations* antagonima to the 
refugees, little ooncrete has taken place in the way of resettle­
ment* The host states still consider the State of Israel as an 
outsider in the Middle East* They have used the refugee problem 
to maintain a semblanoe of Arab Unity as well as to carry out 
their personal hatreds for Israel in an indirect manner* 
By prolonging the refugee situation, they have created a 
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problem isbioh they now find damaging to theaiselves unci so far 
insoluble» The refugsea hava become armed, .dth the aid of 
the iirab States, and have become militant, both toward Israel 
and toward the ilrab States wbdoh still refuse to grant them 
political equality* The Palestinians have since I967 broadened 
their fi^t against colonialism in Israel to a fi^t against 
the colonialist /irab Governments. Today, more than ever before, 
the ilrab States, with the possible exception of Syria, would 
like to find a solution to the refugee problem before they 
themselves are eradicated. However, because of the rising power 
of the Palestinians, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
begin a governmental compromise. The Arab Governments are 
finding that now they must concentrate more on preserving their 
own existence than on trying to come to an agreement with Israel. 
It has also becoî;;e doubtful whether the lirab Governments and the 
Israeli Government could achieve a solution even if they agreed 
to one on paper. For, the Palestinians, and their militant 
ooiïEiando organizations, have taken the position that there will 
be no solution without Palestinian participation. 
Though the Palestinians now seem to be beyond the control of 
the Arab States, most of the hosts are concerned with the inter­
nal and regional consequences being brought on by the commandos 
and are looking for ways both the solve the situation permanently 
and to placate their T'aiestinian populations in the meantime, 
'fhe Syrian Government is backing the Palestinians and presently 
shoira little worry for the oountry's internal security or its 
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relationships with the other host governments. 
The refugees' belief that time would not solve the problem 
is becoming moTe certain. Rather time seeaa to h'ava hardened 
Palestinian determination to regain the homeland in Palestine. 
The refugees' actions have proved a detriment to many of the 
Arab States and to relationships betv/een the various countries 
in the area. Tet, they also have started the Governments 
oonoerned to consider more seriously than ever before the 
possibilities open for a final solution to the problems. 
GHàJPTii.i fil 
COHCIUSIOHS 
The Palestine conflict wsm initially a conflict between 
govemnmnts in the area. The Arab Governments had (me set of 
prereqnisitea for a solution} the Jews another. The ixab 
officials took idie more legal of the two positions, basing their 
stands on United Nations resolutions, azui particularly on the 
solution outlined in Resolution 194(111)• They also felt that 
any solution should be of the total problem and not on an 
issue-by-isse basis. Hor would they agree to direct talks 
with the Israeli Government's representatives. The Israeli 
Government refused to take back the refugees because of secur­
ity reasons as well as the influx of J&m it had absorbed both 
from around the world and frtm the neighboring Arab States. 
iiather, Israeli officials, prior to 196?, preferred the reset­
tlement of the refugees in the iirab States. They also felt that 
the only means to & solution was direot talks between the 
governments involved on an issue by issue basis. 
During this time of Arab—Israeli ^vernamntal deadlock 
on a diplomatic level, the refugees were ezisting in the host 
countries in refugee camps set up by the United Nations. Thou#i 
fairly docile politically in the earlier years of the conflict, 
they were even then making their feelings known by their reactions 
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to United îmtlons aid* Thej raxused to take paa-t in major 
resettloîaent programs as these would prejudice their right to 
repatriation or oompansation. They preferred to keep the 
oonfliot alive by their presence as refugees rather than begin­
ning life anew in the ^trab States where they did not feel wel-
coao. By using educational facilities provided by UHH.vA, with 
the aim of preparing them for resettlement, they kept alive 
and nurtured a Palestinian culture. 
Gradually this Jralestinian culture bacai.ie stronger, ^rior 
to the June iiax and with the encouragement of thw iirab states, 
the xalestinianQ began forming militant, political groups whose 
aim was to liberate r'alestine* These groups have kept up a 
steady war of attrition on Israel from outside of the State's 
borders. However, their hopes of beginning coamando activities 
from within Israel proper and from within the occupied areas 
have largely failed. 
Israeli officials, particularly after the 196? </ar, have 
taken measures to quell such activities among the /irabs in 
Israel, economic ties have been maintained between Israel and 
the neighboring Arab states. The military has also tried to 
maintain the governments in the occupied areas on the f<mner 
basis as much as possible. The expanding Israeli econoz^y Is 
another incentive to the refugees to tolerate Israeli rule. 
However, Israeli officials have taken no concrete, long-range 
steps to find a solution to the conflict or to provide the 
refugo'ïs with a status other than their taaporary, ftnistrating 
CŒie of refugees# Also, whan any of the Israeli Arab ijopulation 
has attempted sabotage or even aided the conmando groups, 
retaliation has been swift and severe. 
The Arab States, thou^ moro kinsmen of the Palestinians 
than the Jews, have encountered ever increasing probleE® with 
the refugees. Only Jordan, among the roajor host states has 
granted the refugees citizenship. In the other states refugees* 
movœients are restrictedj they are not citizens, and many are 
not allowed to work, The Arabs are now having their own prob­
lems vyitL the refugees, and with the consaando groups which 
they instigated. The consnandos are demanding equality with the 
Arab Govemments and are demanding they be allowed to operate 
from Arab territory to launch their military forays against 
Israel, The jirab States do not seem able to curtail this 
activity as the Pelestinians are better armed than the hosts, 
Palestinian raids on Israel also bring retaliatory raids on the 
host countries, not just on the Palestinians, Thus, they are 
becoming more a military than social problem to their ;lrab hosts. 
The Ialestinians, like the Israelis, do not favor and claim 
they will not accept a solution which is imposed on them. At 
this time, several of the „rab States seemingly would like to 
have a solution imposed just to rid themselves of the problems 
they have with the refugees. The Israelis and the Palestinians 
both feel that the problem is two-sided. However, the sides 
they choose are different. The Palestinians maintain that the 
problem is between themselves and the iitate of Israel, Israeli 
officiels fjiil that tà«- ^roblec should be solved by tlu regional 
govsrnrnents, Yst, the Palestinians, who currently aoeE to be 
blocking a settlaaant, do not appear at all vvilling to oomj^omise# 
And to arrive at any solution, compromise would bo neoessara' 
between the ooaiaandos, tho /urab Govornnonts and the Israeli 
Government* 
^s^eoially in the ̂ ast ten years, the ral^tiniane have 
been nxjre uf a liability than an asset in finding a solution 
to the kiddle aastern conflict, ^ilthough oc..asîùndo influence on 
Israel and the host countries did affeot the ̂ jcab states and 
Israel* s decisions to try to agree to some solution based on 
the 19o7 security Council Resolution, any agreement is still 
negligible. Too, although UI©.»Â and other organisations have 
expended a great deal of money in the area, little has been 
achieved except tlie continued existence of the refugee popu­
lations, The refugees have not helped to end the drudgery of 
life in the camps nor have they contributed to the development 
of the xirab Lliddle Jast. By remaining refugees they have 
prolonged the Palestine conflict and have rejuvenated a Pales­
tinian culture and political entity. 
In Israel, the ̂ tate they are out to destroy, they have 
probably been the least officious, although their nuisance value 
has been more than minimal. They have consistently rejected 
solutions proposed by the Arabs, by Israel and by the United 
Hâtions. Yet, they have developed no conorete set of plans or 
programs of their own. The entire case of the Palestinians seems 
to rust yn a nagbtlvu idoa—the. vruotion of the ̂ i^te of 
Israel as it now exists, j^jond. this thv various .u.lestiuian 
groups are unat.1© to agroe on -hat form another _alwstiniaa 
state should take and .vhethor it would or would %ot iaolude 
the present Jewish population of the area. That both the 
. --lostinians and Israel have stated thqy .ifould be agreeable to 
Ù. state comprised of both ^rabs and Jews, if the other g^roup 
were willi.;;s to live peacefully, has proved to be no opening for 
a . ̂.lestinian-Iaraeli settluraunt. .^ach is envisioning a state 
in whioh it is dominant, not a state where .arau and Jew are 
eq.ual. Thus, the current problem would just be continued, 
poscibly in closer proximity. 
i'o confuse the situation even aore, the ^ alestinians 
refuse to aooe^t an imposed solution and are so j.-reoooupied 
with their military endeavors that they have little time to 
sit down and participate in any concrete discussions ahich i&ight 
result in partial or total solution. The ralestinians also 
claim that any solution should ue between themselves aad the 
Israelis, The Israelis want a governmental solution. The 
jvrabs, in a weak position and being pressui'ed by botli the 
Israelis and the Palestinians, seem more and more willing to 
try to find an agreeable solution /hich can be achieved honor­
ably. 
On the iidlitary level, the . alestinians originally vdith 
backing from some of the ;irab Jtates have drastically escalated 
the conflict, .ere it not for the guerilla attacks since the 
1967 the I iddxe .est -vould h:.v . virtually boon . t _.eaca. 
By being so militaristic, the . alastinians have caused the Arab 
host states to increase their OV.TI arnies ;»nd volice forces 
both the maintain order Internally fmd to defend thoraelvas 
against the grovfing number of Israeli reprisals. This grovving 
number of reprisals can be directly attributed to the increasing 
number of attacks made on Israel by the ralostinians. 
By thzlr militance, the . alestinifins sosm to have j^^ainod 
few allies, oithor regionally or internationally, at least for 
their rneans, I^any still do sympathize with their flight and 
with their overall objective to regain Palestine, at least in 
the 'Iddlo Bast. However, by transforming the conflict from 
a diplomatic stalemate into a military standoff at best, the 
commandos have gotten publicity, but little additional support, 
Esther the Arab hosts are now expending more energy in trying 
to control the :alestinians-—the'Scune groups they were instru­
mental in cr9ating--than they are in devoting time to a solution. 
The Palestinians have been one cause of a worsening of relations 
between the Arab host governments as well as between the Arab 
and Israeli Governments. Their actions have also showi the 
Israeli and Arab Govcrmn nta the necessity of settling the con­
flict as soon as possible. Yet, because of j ileatinian influ­
ence and disruptions in the Arab States, none of these Govern­
ments has felt secure enou^ to attempt a oompromiae settlement. 
In addition to military reourcuasions, the worsening military 
situation has also had economic and social conseq.uenoes for the 
area. By forcinft tho = r&b States s-nd Israel to place so much 
money, time and emphasis on the military, the i-alestinians have 
contributed to a slovd-ng of the development of the entire area# 
They have certainly not helped agricultural or industrial 
development by refusing to allow major United Hâtions irriga­
tion projects such as the Yarmuk—Jordan 7alley progi'aci. Other 
effects, however, have been r.ore indirect, tut not any less 
damaging. 
By turning UîHîM camps into guerilla tr aining areas, the 
groups have earned the wrath of ever—growing segments of i&e 
international community. Indignation at this technique has 
roant that some of the refugees foinerly eligible for relief 
no longer are. These refugees must be supported by the host 
states in //hich they are residing or must fend for themselves, 
l.ither method has placed the burden of their support on the 
host states. This has meant an Increasing diversion of monies 
v.'hich nl(yb.t other?d.se have been available for development of the 
area, National development would croate jobs, some of which 
might be secured for the refugees. However, to many of the 
refugees, giving up camp life for permanent employment still 
indicates acceptance of a de facto resettlement which they 
oppPSe, 
•iooially the refugees have refused to integrate themselves 
with the host populations; nor have the host countries really 
wanted ùhem. Those refugees living in Israel have had little 
opportunity to become integrated with the Jewish population, 
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altWugh they seem more eager for equality than their counter­
parts in the Arab State». The refugees, rather, sema to 
prefer life in the aeourity of the refugee camps to that in 
a strange world where they must struggle to ezist* Their schools 
in particular have remained oriented toward the past Palestin­
ian culture. Socialization, throu^ education, has deliberately 
brou^t about a more conscious feeling of being Palestinian 
tinan Arab. 
Though the Israelis hare consistently maintained that the 
host countries should resettle the refugees because of dose 
religious, social and cultural ties, the Palestinians maintain 
that these ties do not exist, at least to the extent thou^t by 
the Israelis. The feeling of being Palestinians, together with 
the discrimination encountered in the host states, has done 
little to gensM^te a feeling of Arab brotherhood, àren in 
Israel, which semis to have tees&p problems with the Palestinians 
than the Arab Govermmnts, the Palestinians are definitely not 
equal to tiie JmdLsh population. 
The social and eooncHoio problems oatmed by the refugees have 
bew sxare a function of their political feelings and military 
actions than they have of pre-planned courses of action. Parti­
cularly in their relations with Jordan and Lebanon have the 
refugees brought near chaos to internal politics. The delicate 
baleaoe on which the Government of Lebanon rests could be (wm-
pletely torn apart by the refugees. That in Jordan has been 
brou^t to the brink of destruction on several occasions, with 
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the refugee#, as cdtissens in Jordan, waging muoh influence on the 
country» The fact that Syria and !:;gypt have encouraged the 
Palestinian forays against Israel while Lebanon and Jordan hare 
been cool toward this activity has not bolstered the almost 
fictitious Arab unity. The two states which have opposed 
reAigee military activities have had to bear the brunt of 
military and political repureussions both internally aM. 
externally Arom Israel as it is these two territories tvom 
r/hioh the major share of the attacks are launched. Bo^ Jordan 
and ̂ gypt have been prime losers of territory, especially after 
the June War. Each state seem to view the Palestinian pro-
blaa frcm its own perspective rather than working together to 
achieve an overall settlement. 
Yet, the hosts* treatmmat of the refugees seems to have had 
little affect on the refugees reactions to the hosts. Though 
the refugees are citizens in Jordan, they have caused cm mudi 
if not more trouble there ^an they have in ̂ gypt and Leban(m 
where they are not accorded citiaenship or status. Their reactions 
to the hosts seem to be based on criteria other than how they 
are treated. The Palestinians, in fighting to destroy a 
colonialist situation in Israel, have seen a similar situation 
in Jordan and Lebanon and seem equally deteimined to eradicate 
Arab colonialism. Thus, though the Arab States would like to 
see the elimination of Israel as a neighbor, they are coming to 
feel safer having Israel on their borders than having the 
refugees in their own wuntries. Qaly Syria, so far, does not 
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seem particularly incoitvenienoed by the reAigees. The Govern­
ment has been willing to support their cause and mioourages 
their militemoe. Yet, few of their military aotivities actually 
take place fr<m Syrian territory. 
The participation ^f the Palestinians in Arab League meetings 
has proved, another disruptive influence. The Palestine problem 
is, of course, on the agenda. The conference is disrupted by 
Arab infighting tm this topic. Though the Arabs have now 
included the Palestinians in regional activities, the Pales­
tinians have fOTsmd tkeir own regional organisation which 
excludes the Arab ̂ ^amments. The Palestiniai^ want to be 
included in iirab affairs, yet they also want to maintain their 
independence fr<m #e Arab Governments. This sentiment has 
created a situation idxich the Arab Governments are now finding 
difficult to ju8tif)y. For a people without a developed inf^a-
stxucture and wl#out a territory of their own from which to 
operate, the Palestinians are politically powerful to an uncom­
mon degree. Just by threats against Israel, the Palestinians 
are coming to wield more and more political influence* That 
the host govemmmiW are not militarily or politically able to 
curtail them has caused m&ny additional problems. Thus, while 
the Palestinians have grown stronger, the host governments have 
gradually realized that they have created more problems for 
themselves than they had wMLa simply fighting Israel* 
However, the refugees powerful position in the Middle Bast 
may not be so stable as they would like to think, Thou^ the 
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hosts oannot treat the refugees as patms presently, the Arab 
Governments are b0<XNaing increasingly vmry of the power ooa-
oentrated in the refugees* hands. Seemingly they will try to 
control or decrease this power as soon as they can determine 
how* It would still s^^era that if the Arabs end the Israelis 
ware to agree to a solution, the refugees oould be forced to abide 
by it# For the Israelis, as evidenced by their continuing war 
with the commandos and the Arab States, do have the military 
power neoeewmary to Impose a solution, if it were to be imposed 
only on the reftjgees. 
It irould appear, however, Ijkat a solution imposed from 
outside would be docmed to failure. The refugees and the 
Israelis are bol^ against such a solution. The refugees and 
the Arab Governments blame the present problem on the United 
Hâtions and "foreign intervention" and so would not be likely 
to ask those who perpetrated -&e present problem to solve it. 
The refugees are fitting against larael and oolonialiem and 
an outside imposed solution wcnild seemingly be just another 
form of oolonialiam* 
A regional solution because of the Palestinians a&em oloser 
t an ever before. Yet, several major obstacles still need to 
be overcome before there would even be serious peace discussion. 
Palestinian insistence on the implementation of Besolution 194(111) 
is both impractical and in^ossible, as the Arab Governments have 
come to realize. On this stand, the Palestinians have few 
allies. Hather, the Israelis and most of the ilrab Governments 
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hare indicated qualified acceptance of the Sovendîer, 1967» 
Security Council Résolution. Yet, little has been done to 
explore its possibilities for a settlement, largely because of 
the stand of the Palestinians against it. For the Palestinians, 
fearing an jlrab—Israel i solution, have kept Arab intmrnal 
politic» unstable as well as continuing their military actions 
against Israel. This haa left little time for either direct 
or indirect governmental ne^tiations. 
The Palestinians unwillingness to compromise should come 
as no surprise. Their rejection for twenty years by Israel and 
by the Arab States has caused them to d^mnd a separate state, 
preferabley a state at the expense of Israel. This feeling of 
rejection, watoined with a growing Palestinian nationalism, 
has provided further complications to the problem. 
However, because of the lack of agreement on comiando 
means and goals as well as the lack of militance on the part 
of the Israeli Arabs, it would seem probable that the Pales­
tinians could agree to a settlement, if given their own state. 
Many of the Palestinians are noiwailitant sympathizers with the 
coœando cause, but seem more anxious to rebuild a stable, per­
sonal life than to destroy Israel. A Palestinian state would 
not necessarily mean the destruction of Israel, but certainly 
some Israeli territory would have to be contributed. If the 
Palestinian and Israeli Giuiem that they were willing to live 
in peace are more than propagandizing, such a state mi^t placate 
the majority of the refugees, thou^ doubtfully all of thsa. Such 
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action mi^t reduce i aleatinlan influence to moT& moderate 
proportione» 
Althou^ the ialestinians have caïused the i^abs and the 
Israelis to think seriously about a solution to the iale#tine 
problem and to the r@^ ngw proi^lea, they have also created a 
ollmate which i» not conducive to making peace. They have 
forced the laraelia and the ^irabs to think first of their omi 
defense and preservation end to think secondarily of peace* 
Until recently# the Arab hosts have not really desired to 
curtail the refuses# For all have favored the same cause-
that of restoring Palestine to Arab rule, Bow that the Arab 
Governments are being threatened politically and militarily 
by the Palestinians, they find themselves unable to curtail 
refugee activities* 
whether an Arab-Israeli settlement would ever placate the 
Palestinians is difficult to guess. However, it would aotm that 
with th@ commando movement possibly losing some of its original 
attraction and with a partial refugee acceptance of Israel, at 
least on the part of those living in Israel and the occupied 
ax&aSf that the refugees too might be willing to accept a 
settlement short of the 1948 Résoluticm, or short of the 
eradication of Israel. However, they, like the Arabs end the 
Isratelis, have taken suoh a dogoatic political position that 
it seems especially difficult for them to reverse it, even 
gradually. 
Since it has not been possible to settle the issue among the 
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regional governments 8lno% 194B, it soeuia ao mora likely that 
by adding another faotor—the refugees—to the oontooversy that 
a solution will be achieved any more readily. Althou^ the 
rafugees have brought about a desire for peao@, jpartioularly 
on the part of the ^Irt a Govarnnenis, they have helped to 
provide neither the means nor the conditions necessary to 
concentrate on a peace aettlmmit. Kor does it eeais that the 
refugees will be instrummital in bringing about a peaceful set­
tlement of the conflict, solely on their om. terms, in the 
near future. 
The curreait problem still seems to be one between the 
Middle &ast Govemments. Yet, the situation is more com%)lex 
than twenty years ago. The Governments still mist a^jree to 
a compromise solution, 3ut, if and when they do agree, and 
the situation is rapdily beocaning one in s.hioh they , ould like 
to agree, they are f&dnj a problem which did not exist twenty 
years ago. Mow, in addition to agreeing on a solution, the 
^irab and Israeli Governments rnxat devise the means to either 
impose su(^ a solution on -Wie Palestinians or gain l-alastinian 
acceptance of a solution. 
APPSKDIX A 
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February 20, 1970, p. 3» 
APPENDIX B 
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Sources The Christian Science Monitor, 
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APPEÎÎÛIX C 
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Source: The Christian Science Monitor. April 30, 1969, p. 9. 
APPENDIX i) 
UNIT&D KAÎIONB, GKHEBAL ASSBMBLY 
ssiOLUTicai 194(111), DEcmma 11, 1948 
FAMGHAPH 11 
11# RESOLVES that the refugees wishing to return to their 
htmes and live at peace with #ieir nei^bora should be p@Md.tted 
to do so at the earliest ixraotioable date, and that oompftosaticm 
should be paid for the progeria of those ohoosing not to return 
and for loss of or damage to property laâiioh, ui^er principles 
of international law or in equi^, should be made good by the 
Governments or authorities responsible} 
the Gonoili&ti(m G «mission to facilitate 
the reimtriation, resettlement and eoonosio and social rehabiXi» 
tation of the refugees and the payment of (xmpensation, and 
to maintain olose relations with the Director of the United 
Nations Belief fen? Palestine EeAigees and, throu^ him, with the 
appropriate organs aM agencies of the United Hationsf • • • • 
APFKSflIX E 
UHITEi) liVTIOHS, SiiCUEITY GCXÎHCIL 
RisomciŒ 242 (1967), movEmm 22, 1967 
The 3eouxity Counoll, 
Éxs'T&mniJûLg its o(mtizming oonoem with the grave situation 
in the Middle East, 
azgihaalzing the inadmissibility of the actuisition of 
territoxy by war axsd the need to work for a just aM lasting 
peaoe in which every State in the area oan live in sewrity, 
âaphasizing flirter that all Member States in their acoep-
tanoA of the Charter of the United Bâtions have undertaken a 
oœmitment to ajt in acoordance wii^ Article 2 of the Charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of #e Charter principles 
requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle Bast which should include the application of both ^he 
following principles* 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel anmd forces from territories 
owupled in reo^t conflict; 
(ii) Tœndnation of all claim» or states of belligerency 
and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty* 
territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State in the area and their ri^t to live in 
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free 
frcm threat or acte of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
(a) for gumranteeing Areedam of navigation -Utrou^ 
international waterways in the area; 
b) For a<Aievlng a just settlemmt of the refugee problem; 
c) For guaranteeing the twritwial inviolability and 
political independence of evwry State in the area, 
thrwigh measures including the establishmmit of 
demilitarized z<mes; 
3« Bequests the Secretary-General to designate a Special 
Representative to proceed to the lîiddle Bast to establii^ and 
maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote 
agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted 
settlenœnt in aocwdance with the provisions and principles in 
this resolution} 
4# Bequests the Seoret&ry-Geaeral to report to the 
Security Ommoil <m the progress of the efforts of the Speoial 
BepresentatiTe as soon as possible. 
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